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I. INTRODUCTION
In his concurring opinion on the lack of constitutional protection
for hard-core pornography, Associate Justice Potter Stewart ex-
pressed frustration in attempting to "define what may be indefina-
ble."1 Rather, he resorted to a subjective, instinctive standard in
stating the now oft-quoted expression, "I know it when I see it."'2
Similarly, attorneys may boldly dive into client representation
naively believing that they too will know (a conflict) when they see
it.3 Such a non-systematic approach to identifying conflicts of in-
terest can leave attorneys and their firms exposed to conflicts of
interest claims. As suggested by the size and frequency of legal
malpractice claims and disqualification motions involving conflicts
of interest, a significant number of attorneys and firms have failed
to see and address serious conflicts of interest. A Harris and Asso-
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. Id.; see also Sarah F. Warren, Art: To Fund or Not to Fund? That Is Still the Ques-
tion, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENrT. L.J. 149, 178 (2001) (noting that "an attempt to define
something that is inherently subjective is fraught with complication").
3. See generally C.K. Gunsalus & Judith Rowan, Conflicts of Interest in the University
Setting: I Know It When I See It, RES. MGMT. REV. 13, 15 (1989) (noting that other profes-
sionals, including academics, may use a similar approach).
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ciates study of 1,100 firms with over 35 attorneys ("Harris Study")
revealed that the most significant errors alleged in the largest mal-
practice claims involved conflicts of interest.4
All conflicts of interests can be characterized as "serious" be-
cause a conflict effectively gives a disgruntled client or an adver-
sary a kind of "wild card." With such a "wild card," the disgruntled
client possesses a great deal of leverage in refusing to pay outstand-
ing fees and in seeking a refund of fees previously paid. A jointly
represented client might also "play the card and require the with-
drawal of the attorney (and the attorney's law firm) entirely from
the case."'5 Clients who suffer damages as a result of conflicts
might also bring legal malpractice suits alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence claims. In bankruptcy practice, the court may
deny compensation for legal services and reimbursement of ex-
penses if an attorney is not a "disinterested person at any time dur-
ing his employment."'6 Another risk is that an adversary can ask or
force the conflicted attorney to withdraw from representation. An
attorney who withdraws due to a conflict of interest may also face a
fee forfeiture.
Depending on the applicable legal malpractice policy and the al-
leged malpractice, conflicts of interest claims may not be covered.
Even when the claim is covered by insurance, the insured attorney
or firm will still be responsible for the deductible under the policy
and future insurance premium surcharges based on claims experi-
ence. Other costs relate to the time and resources devoted to de-
4. Sean M. Fitzpatrick & Catherine Gallo, Managing Professional Liability Risk at
Large Law Firms: New Harris Study Yields Valuable Insights, 580 P.L.I. 1029, 1034 (1998),
WESTLAW 580 PLI/Lit 1029; see also A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF'L
LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 1996-1999 (2000) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal) (reporting that ABA studies of malpractice claims in 1985, 1995, and
1999 indicate that 3.45%, 3.79%, and 5.12%, respectively, of claims were due to conflicts of
interest errors). The American Bar Association study assigns one cause of error to each
claim, and does not consider the influence of a conflicts of interest allegation on claims
involving other alleged errors. Id. Texas Lawyers' Insurance Exchange ("TLIE") statistics
indicate that in claims filed in 1996 or later, 16.4% of all claims included an alleged con-
flicts of interest. Interview with Jett Hanna, Senior Vice President for Underwriting and
Administration for TLIE (Apr. 22, 2002). Such claims accounted for 22.5% of all losses
and defense costs paid in the same period. Id. TLIE's statistics suggest that allegations of
conflicts of interest increase the severity of losses in malpractice claims. Id.
5. In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 586 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (referring to jointly repre-
sented clients who did not sign a written consent to a potential conflict of interest).
6. In re Perry, 194 B.R. 875, 879 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 328(c)).
2002]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
fending conflicts claims and disqualification motions. In addition
to the tangible costs, conflicts hurt the reputation and standing of
those attorneys whose integrity has been attacked. "Conflicted"
attorneys can face discipline and sanctions imposed by courts and
regulators. Even when a perceived conflict does not result in a
court action or sanction, clients may simply decide not to use the
offending attorney, or may make comments that generate un-
wanted publicity.7 Finally, conflicts of interest claims damage the
legal profession when the public loses "trust and confidence in the
integrity of the bar, the judiciary and the administration of
justice."8
Understanding the consequences of conflicts claims and the risks
of relying on subjective determinations by individual attorneys, risk
management experts have recommended the adoption of policies
and procedures to avoid conflicts of interest. 9 During the last two
decades, many attorneys and firm managers have heeded the rec-
ommendation to implement conflicts of interest procedures and
systems.' 0 Data obtained in the Harris Study confirmed that firms
that utilized conflicts of interest systems and other risk manage-
7. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: The Lawyers' Former Client
Raises Questions of Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at C7, 2002 WL 8719471 (reporting
that a former client of the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner accused the firm of having
a conflict when a lawyer who did not work on his case agreed to represent an Enron em-
ployee). The Enron employee was to be an adverse witness in the client's case, but the
case was dismissed prior to the time that the firm began representing the Enron employee.
Id. The New York Times article reveals no other connection between the two matters. Id.
8. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 16.1, at 687
(5th ed. 2000).
9. E.g., Dee Crocker, The Problem with Conflicts, 54 OR. ST. B. BULL. 41, 41 (1994),
WESTLAW 54-MAR ORSBB 41. Ms. Crocker, loss prevention counsel for the Oregon
Professional Liability Fund, explains that measures can "reduce the likelihood of a conflict
or reduce the possibility that others will perceive that a conflict exists." Id.; see also A.B.A.
LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 56 (2d ed. 1999) (urging
firms to establish "stringent procedures" for identifying and resolving various conflicts situ-
ations that arise).
10. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick & Catherine Gallo, Managing Professional Liability Risk
at Large Law Firms: New Harris Study Yields Valuable Insights, 580 P.L.I. 1029, 1033
(1998), WESTLAW 580 PLI/Lit 1029 (noting that "even the use of relatively more conven-
tional risk management techniques, such as having a risk management partner and regu-
larly circulating new client memos, has increased substantially"). According to the Harris
Study, 85% of firms used conflict-checking software as compared to only 16% ten years
earlier. Id.
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ment policies experienced less in claims than firms without these
practices.11
Prevention of conflicts of interest requires several steps. To be-
gin with, an attorney must have sufficient information to determine
when a conflict of interest exists, and utilize this information to
analyze the potential for conflicts. In a law firm, controls and
structures to allow this analysis must be available, coupled with a
culture and incentives that support risk management efforts so that
the controls work as planned.
Conflicts of interest systems, along with other risk management
systems, help to form what has been called the ethical infrastruc-
ture of the firm. In 1991, Professor Ted Schneyer coined the term
"ethical infrastructure" to refer to "a law firm's organization, poli-
cies, and operating procedures" that control the ethical quality of
law practice.12 While firms are investing more time and resources
in building an ethical infrastructure,13 conflicts of interest continue
to perplex and plague firms, as illustrated by a recent $400 million
conflicts of interest claim against a Philadelphia-based firm.1 4 Are
such conflicts of interest claims the inevitable price of providing
legal services, or do such claims indicate cracks in a firm's ethical
infrastructure?
To answer the question on the inevitability of conflicts, Part II of
this Article describes measures that law firms can take to detect
11. See id. at 1035 (explaining the relation of risk management practices to the num-
ber of claims). "While not significant to the 95% certainty level," the risk management
measures taken which inversely related to the total amount paid in claims, included using
conflicts of interest checking software and circulating new client memoranda at least every
two weeks. Id.
12. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4
(1991). In advocating professional discipline of firms as entities, Professor Schneyer points
to the "evidentiary problems of pinning professional misconduct on one or more members
of a lawyering team, the reluctance to scapegoat some lawyers for sins potentially shared
by others in their firm, and especially the importance of a law firm's ethical infrastructure
and the diffuse responsibility for creating and maintaining that infrastructure." Id. at 11.
13. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick & Catherine Gallo, Managing Professional Liability Risk
at Large Law Firms: New Harris Study Yields Valuable Insights, 580 P.L.I. 1029, 1033
(1998), WESTLAW 580 PLI/Lit 1029 (noting that the "utilization of certain risk manage-
ment practices at law firms has increased dramatically over the decade from 1987 through
1996"); see also Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences
the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 272-73 (1998) (discussing
the important role that malpractice insurers play in influencing firms to develop "sound
infrastructure").
14. Gary Young, Malpractice Trial for Duane Morris, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A17.
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and manage conflicts. Part II goes on to analyze the effect of the
firm's ability to avoid conflicts claims on a firm's ethical infrastruc-
ture. Part III focuses on some of the most common conflicts situa-
tions that result in malpractice claims and sanctions. The
discussion includes selected conflicts cases that illustrate problems
and patterns. The conclusion, Part IV, urges firm managers to re-
assess the efficiency and long-term benefits of devoting time and
resources to conflicts avoidance and management.
II. FORMULATING SYSTEMS TO AVOID AND
MANAGE CONFLICTS
1 5
Attorneys should take several steps in order to avoid conflicts of
interest claims. Attorneys must obtain sufficient knowledge of the
facts regarding proposed representation to begin a conflict analysis.
In particular, it must be understood whose interests need to be an-
alyzed. Once attorneys have knowledge of the parties and inter-
ests, they must determine the extent to which those interests
conflict. In law firms, a combination of formalized controls and
policies are essential to assure proper analysis of conflicts. The
policies and controls must include development of appropriate re-
sponses to the analysis. The need for formalized controls and poli-
cies grows as the firm and number of clients represented grows.
This section of the Article examines the complexity of identifying,
analyzing, and dealing with conflicts of interest.
15. See generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§§ 2.1-2.5, at 49-67 (5th ed. 2000) (discussing malpractice and grievance prevention
techniques for lawyers and law firms). Malpractice insurers provide loss prevention
materials which may be useful. See LawyersInsurance.com, Risk Management Services, at
https://www.lawyersinsurance.com/html/rm-body.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002)
(providing "an array of risk management services and products"); Attorney's Liability
Assurance Society, Loss Prevention, at http://www.alas.com/members.shtml (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002) (providing a loss prevention manual to its insureds). Attorney's Liability
Assurance Society is a captive insurer that insures many of the largest law firms in the
country. Id. Many of the members of the National Association of Bar Related Insurance
Companies, such as TLIE, provide loss prevention material in either printed form or on
the web. Texas Lawyers' Insurance Exchange, Risk Management at Research Tools, at
http://www.tlie.org/risk.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). In addition, consulting firms like
Altman Weil, Inc., as well as some law firms, such as Hinshaw Culbertson, provide
malpractice prevention consulting. See Altman Weil, Inc., at http://www.altmanweil.com
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002); Hinshaw Culbertson, The Lawyers' Risk Management Site, at
http://www.lawyeringlaw.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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A. Procedures and Controls in Law Firms
Law firms must develop policies, procedures, and controls re-
garding conflict detection and avoidance. Ethics rules generally re-
quire that partners in a law firm establish a system to assure that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the rules 16 and to require supervis-
ing lawyers to assure the ethical compliance of subordinate lawyers
and staff.17  Correspondingly, firm liability results from the
breaches of its constituents. 18 Practicing in professional corpora-
tions, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability companies
may act to insulate the assets of "innocent" attorneys from the acts
of other attorneys in a law firm.' 9 However, even when the organi-
zational structure of a firm eliminates vicarious liability, the failure
to take precautionary steps risks the firm's malpractice insurance
experience ratings, reputation, and assets. Ultimately, limited lia-
bility entities do not reduce the risk of conflict claims.2 0
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.1 (2001). The term "partners" under the
Model Rules includes shareholders in a professional corporation. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, Terminology [6] (2001). The Texas Rules do not have a provision paral-
lel to Model Rule 5.1 affirmatively requiring that partners set up such systems. Thus, Texas
would not recognize a failure to have such systems as constituting a violation of the rules,
but civil liability for failing to have such a system is not determined by the rules. When this
Article discusses disciplinary rules, the American Bar Association Model Rules are refer-
enced even though each state enacts its own disciplinary rules. On February 5, 2002, the
American Bar Association House of Delegates amended the Model Rules. See A.B.A.,
Center for Professional Responsibility, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202report.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2002) (providing a summary of what rules were changed and a link to
the redline version of changes to the Model Rules). Unless otherwise stated, all references
to the Model Rules in this Article are to the previous version of the rules.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2001).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58(1) (2000)
(stating that "[a] law firm is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by
any wrongful act or omission of any principal or employee of the firm who was acting in
the ordinary course of the firm's business or with actual or apparent authority").
19. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 5.4-5.6, at
480-81, 495-96, 509-10 (5th ed. 2000).
20. See Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities. An
Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 641, 645-48
(1998) (arguing that the risk of malpractice loss is not affected positively or negatively by
the existence of limited liability entities). But see Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Re-
sponsibility and Liability Issues Related to Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 399, 421 (1998) (arguing that limited liability entities have increased the likelihood of
ethical violations and malpractice claims because their structure "may actually undermine
partners' willingness to get involved in firm management and risk management activities").
2002]
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
Conflict avoidance must be viewed in conjunction with the man-
agement of the entire firm, and not simply as a subsystem isolated
from other firm processes.2' Several partners of the Shearman &
Sterling law firm eloquently summarized the purpose of and diffi-
culties inherent in the formulation of such policies and procedures
in law firms:
As lawyers we have duties to our clients, to third parties in limited
circumstances, to government regulators, to the courts, to our part-
ners, to our employees, and to our community. Often it is not easy
to reconcile these responsibilities. The policies and procedures we
adopt to meet these duties must be designed to deal appropriately
with them, not just to satisfy formal legal and ethical requirements.
These policies and procedures communicate our values and aspira-
tions to legal and non-legal staff. Whatever policies and procedures
we adopt, they must be workable, respected, and effective. An ar-
ticulated policy or procedure that is not followed is likely to be a
source of problems.22
The terms "policies," "procedures," and "controls" come from
the language of business management. 23 A policy is a statement of
the goals of an organization, and includes the general methods that
will be used to meet firm goals. Policies often are broadly worded
position statements that casual observers may dismiss as platitudes.
However, policies serve the important purpose of focusing the
work to be done on procedures and controls. Ideally, once policies
21. See Joel F. Henning, Quality Assurance: Much More Than Minimizing Malprac-
tice, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR LAW FIRMS 29-35 (1992) (emphasizing that com-
plete quality assurance in law firms involves meeting competence standards, meeting client
needs and expectations, and satisfying firm member expectations).
22. Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing
Responsibilities, 48 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1567 (1993), WESTLAW 48 BUSLAW 1567.
23. See generally Finnevo Oy, ISO 9000-Related Terms, at http://www.finnevo.fi/eng/
contents/iso9000_terms.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002) (offering useful definitions of pol-
icy, procedures, and control for the purposes of this Article).
Policy, for example, a procedure policy; general guidelines on the attitudes and orien-
tation towards an issue in an organization.
Procedure (Approach), a way in which a task, activity, or process is executed; the way
in which the unit meets the performance requirements presented in the criteria cover-
ing principles, policies, systems, processes, approaches, and techniques.
Control, that part of a management activity that directs the action so that needs, ex-
pectations, and other requirements are met as planned.
[Vol. 33:669
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for an organization are developed, each proposed action can be
examined in light of all policies.
It almost goes without saying that most law firms would have a
policy to avoid violating the disciplinary rules. 24 Whether stated
formally or not, one goal of virtually every law firm and firm law-
yer is profitability. 25 Firms generally have a simultaneous goal of
providing legal services at a reasonable cost. 26 In addition, firms
wish to respond to client needs quickly.27 A law firm may choose
to concentrate its practice on one side of a docket or a transaction
area, or to avoid simultaneously working on transactional and liti-
gation aspects of matters. 28 While concentrating in particular prac-
tice areas may avoid some potential conflicts, the reasons for
excluding some types of practice are not always to minimize con-
flict problems. Concentration may create economic efficiency that
is lost if too many areas of expertise are included in a firm's
repertoire.
A workable conflict avoidance system serves all law firm goals to
the extent possible, and addresses points of friction between these
goals. However, such a system does come at a cost. Decisions on
24. See Potter Minton, P.C., About the Firm, at http://www.potterminton.com/phil.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (providing an example of a mission statement which embodies
the concept of avoiding violation of disciplinary rules in stating that "[o]ur attorneys and
staff will exhibit professionalism in all matters").
25. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of
Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 965 (1997) (noting that conflicts of
interest rules generally lend predictability to the expectations attorneys and clients have
about attorney-client relationships, encourage efficient provision of legal services, and re-
strict the supply of lawyers).
26. See Potter Minton, About the Firm, at http://www.potterminton.com/phil.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2002) (providing one example of a mission statement stressing a goal to
provide reasonable cost services).
We recognize that the cost of our services is an important consideration for you, and
we strive to provide you with outstanding value. POTTER MINTON's internal struc-
ture is designed to allow us to operate in an environment in which we can be cost
effective and provide the highest value for our clients.
Id.
27. Id. (expressing that "[w]e understand the importance of responsive service ....
[t]he depth of our practice means that we are prepared to meet your legal needs efficiently
and in a timely manner, even in emergency situations").
28. See Garson and Associates Co., L.P.A., Mission Statement, at http://
www.garson.com/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (providing a mission statement
indicative of such an exclusive focus). "Garson and Associates Co., L.P.A. is a law firm
dedicated to providing representation and advocacy for injured persons and their families."
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how to react to conflict situations may result in less revenue for a
law firm. The firm will decline some matters as conflict situations
are identified. Client costs may increase as a result of conflict
avoidance measures.29 Clients often save money by sharing the
services of a single lawyer. If clients cannot use attorneys with
whom they have long term relationships due to conflict concerns,
they incur additional expense in educating new lawyers. 30 The pro-
cess of developing policies, procedures, and controls utilizes re-
sources that might otherwise be channeled into providing legal
services. The process of checking and analyzing conflicts consumes
precious attorney and staff time,31 and might inhibit a law firm's
ability to react in a time sensitive matter. If a conflict procedure is
perceived to take too long to follow, or is perceived to be unneces-
sarily restrictive on freedom of action, attorneys may ignore or try
to circumvent the procedure.32
On the other hand, losses from failure to deal with conflict situa-
tions also reduce firm revenue. Lost reputation may lead to loss of
clients. Malpractice settlements and judgments undermine the eco-
nomic viability of the firm. "[A] conflicts program avoids potential
sanctions, disgorged fees, malpractice judgments, and higher pro-
fessional liability insurance premiums. ' 33 Taking a lax position
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. b (2000).
30. Id.
31. See Rochelle Cheifetz, Asking All the Right Questions: Researching Possible Con-
flicts of Interest, LLRX.coM, at http://www.llrx.com/extras/conflicts.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2002) (offering a humorous and insightful discussion of the overhaul of a conflict of
interest system).
As in many firms, the amount of work [necessary to conduct conflicts checks] has
increased. A corresponding increase in the request for conflict research has kept the
Conflict Researcher more than just a little busy. And, as in most firms, the budget
hasn't increased. I was able to get permission to have a student work with the Con-
flicts Researcher for 10 hours a week. I also have one of our Summer Interns assigned
to that area. I'm still trying to get additional staff.
Id. LLRX.com is the Law Library Resource Xchange and often has interesting articles on
law firm technology. LLRX.coM, at http://www.llrx.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
32. See Rochelle Cheifetz, Asking All the Right Questions: Researching Possible Con-
flicts of Interest, LLRX.coM, at http://www.llrx.com/extras/conflicts.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2002) (stating that "[wie weren't 'just' running the names through the system so a
search didn't take 15 minutes anymore .... When an attorney would become exasperated
and cry, 'Why do you need that? It's simple, just run it through the system!' we would
have to go through the explanations all over again").
33. Robin Dearmon, Mechanics and Methods of Conflict of Interest Management, 3
No. 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 8, 9 (1992), WESTLAW 3 NO. 4 LMALR 8.
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with regard to conflicts of interest may result in more clients and
more time to work on the client matters, but in the long-term may
result in loss of some clients and in unexpected costs to the firm.34
Once a firm's goals, as expressed through policies, are in place,
development of procedures and controls can begin. Procedures are
a means to achieving policy. "Indeed, one must question whether
there is any true policy decision in a sophisticated organization if
there is not a plan to implement it." 35 Controls are mechanisms for
assuring that procedures are in fact followed. A basic conflict
avoidance procedure, for example, is to compare the parties ad-
verse to a proposed client to the database of all past and present
firm clients. A control for this procedure is to prevent the attorney
from billing hours until the attorney has confirmed that he has ac-
tually performed the database comparison.
In a smaller law firm, development of policies is frequently car-
ried out by consensus of the partners or shareholders, either for-
mally or informally. As firm size increases, work through
consensus becomes more difficult. Managing partners are common
at larger firms where committees often deal with various aspects of
firm operations. One or more committees may be assigned to de-
velop aspects of policies, procedures, or controls that may affect
conflict avoidance. Accordingly, ethics committees are common-
place. Such committees may be charged with a quasi-judicial role
in resolving difficult conflicts questions for the firm. In some cases,
a single partner is given the ability to play such a role.36 A quality
control committee with a broad charge to make recommendations
regarding work quality may address issues affecting conflict avoid-
ance.37 Regardless of the structure of firm management, all three
aspects of management-policy, procedures, and controls-de-
serve attention.
34. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121
cmt. b (2000) (noting both the affirmative ethical purposes to be advanced and the compet-
ing economic and practical considerations which lead to a conclusion that "[p]rohibition of
conflicts of interest should therefore be no broader than necessary").
35. Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of Increasing
Responsibilities, 48 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1567 (1993), WESTLAW 48 BUSLAW 1567.
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Firm management must address many issues to create conflict
avoidance policy, procedures, and controls. One common tool
used by firms is a database of past and current clients. Manage-
ment must decide which parties and types of information it will
include in a database. Controls and policies are necessary to assure
appropriate use of the database. The form of new matter memo-
randa and controls to assure review of the memoranda must also
receive attention. Additionally, procedures and controls that force
attorneys to use engagement letters and non-engagement letters
can minimize the likelihood of fee disputes and claims from unin-
tended clients.
Ongoing education of firm members regarding conflict avoid-
ance is critical. Periodically, firm attorneys and staff need to be
reminded of the reasons for procedures. In addition, attorneys and
staff need to be alerted to new developments in the law of conflicts
just as critically as they are educated in their areas of expertise.
To ensure the success of a conflict avoidance plan, management
must devote resources to conflict avoidance. Attorneys who do not
participate in such functions also need access to such resources
when faced with unique conflict situations. Such resources may in-
clude publications, online research capabilities, and seminars re-
garding legal and technological developments related to conflict
avoidance. Often, state law requires that insurers provide loss pre-
vention materials to insureds38 and privileges may attach to discov-
ery of information provided by insurers.39
Even when conflict procedures and controls are perfect on pa-
per, one additional element is essential within a law firm to assure
proper use of those controls-an environment fostering respect for
the ideal of conflict avoidance, as well as for the procedures and
the controls used to carry out that policy.40 This environment
should dissuade any characterization of the procedures and con-
trols as hindrances to economic or other goals. Of course, permit-
38. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.15-3 (a)-(b) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring insurers
offering professional liability insurance to provide loss control information).
39. See id. 5.15-3(f) (precluding loss control information from discovery and admis-
sion as evidence).
40. See Karen K.H. Bell, Managing Conflict of Interest Situations, at http://
www.practicepro.ca/pmatica/conflict.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) (asserting that a con-
flicts checking system only succeeds where there "is a commitment to use the conflict
checking system by every member of [the] firm").
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ting occasional exceptions should be discouraged. If exceptions are
made for senior firm members, the message sent to junior firm
members may be that the bureaucracy of conflict avoidance proce-
dures can be safely ignored.
B. Conflict Checking and Client Screening
The first line of defense against a conflict of interest claim is a
system for checking for potential and actual conflicts prior to the
beginning of representation. A conflicts check is the process of
identifying the persons whose interests an attorney must consider,
and determining whether those interests require action in order to
avoid conflict related claims. The following discussion reviews the
key elements of a conflicts checking system and the degree to
which such a system can effectively avoid conflicts claims.
1. Whose Interests Should Be Analyzed
The search for potential conflicts of interest begins with under-
standing the interests of the attorney and client, and must extend
to understanding their relationships with various people and enti-
ties. Attorney interests which could conflict with client objectives
include law firm, family, business, and other interests.41 The attor-
ney and all firm members have a responsibility to avoid representa-
tion that violates ethical duties.42 Consequently, attorneys must
avoid representation where confidential information may be
shared 43 and where the objectives of one client's representation
conflicts with the objectives of another client.44 Similarly, client in-
terests which could conflict with attorney interests can include the
interests of a number of additional persons.
The list of persons and entities that may have material differ-
ences in objectives is quite long and goes beyond the commonly
assumed roles of attorneys and their clients. 45 In an article describ-
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. c (2000).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.4(a) (2001).
43. Id. 1.6.
44. Id. 1.7, 1.9.
45. A number of authors have developed lists of persons whose interests should be
considered in developing databases used in the initial stage of a conflict check. See, e.g.,
Roy Simon, Conflicts of Interest and Legal Malpractice, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE: TECH-
NIQUES TO AVOID LIABILITY 21-22 (PLI 1999); Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co., Risk Man-
agement & Professional Responsibility Law Practice Assessment, at http://www.lmick.com/
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ing persons who may need to be in a conflicts database, the Oregon
Professional Liability Fund lists the following groups, emphasizing
that their list is incomplete:
(1) Litigation: Insured, Plaintiff(s), Defendant(s), Insurer,
Guardian Ad Litem, Spouse, Expert Witness(es), Lay
Witness(es).
(2) Corporate: Owner, Spouse, Buyer(s), Partner(s), Share-
holder(s), Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Opposing Party, Sell-
er(s), Officer(s), Director(s), Key Employees.
(3) Probate: Deceased, Spouse, Children, Heirs, Devisees,
Trustee(s), Guardian(s), Conservator, Personal Repre-
sentative
(4) Estate Planning: Testator, Personal Representative,
Spouses, Children, Heirs, Devisees, Trustee, Guardian.
(5) Dissolution: Client, Children, Spouse, Grandparents.
(6) Criminal: Client, Witness(es), Co-defendant(s), Victim(s).
(7) Workers' Compensation: Injured Worker, Employer,
Insurer.
(8) Bankruptcy: Client, Creditors, Spouse.
(9) Your firm: All Lawyers, Employees, Spouses, Parents, Sib-
lings, In-laws.
(10) Other: Declined Clients, Adverse Parties, Prospective
Clients.46
As well, the following general classes of persons, in addition to
attorneys and clients, may have interests that need to be consid-
ered in analyzing potential conflict situations.
a. Non-attorney Staff Members
Partners and lawyers having supervisory authority must take rea-
sonable steps to assure that non-attorney staff members do not act
pdfs/law.practice-assessment.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2002); Oregon State Bar Profes-
sional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http://www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 18, 2002); JE'rr HANNA, THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE SELF-AUDIT 30-31 (1995)
(on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
46. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
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in a manner incompatible with the ethical obligations of the firm
and its constituent attorneys.47 As agents of the law firm, legal as-
sistants must conform to the same ethical obligations as the firm.48
b. Prospective Clients and Declined Clients
Communications between a person seeking legal representation
and the attorney considering the possibility of representing that
person fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.49 For
that reason, attorneys must consider the interests of prospective
and declined clients who pass confidential information to the firm.
If a law firm does not represent a client, but is "marketing" for
possible later representation, the firm should develop a method of
tracking such activities. Even if the firm receives no confidential
information, the firm could be embarrassed if it accepts other con-
flicting representation in the midst of the marketing effort.
c. Former Employers of .Attorneys and Staff
Knowledge of client confidences is imputed to all associated law-
yers of the law firm. ° Consequently, when one firm member joins
another firm, the knowledge of that attorney can be imputed to the
new firm. Similar considerations apply to staff who have worked at
one firm and moved to another.51 While mechanisms to avoid such
sharing of confidences may make it possible for a firm to represent
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.3 (2001) (charging supervising attor-
neys with oversight and responsibility to answer the ethical conduct of nonlawyer
assistants).
48. Jett Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the Profes-
sional Liability Risk, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 421, 439-41 (2001) (citing liability situations includ-
ing attorney assistants, primarily where there was evidence of unauthorized practice of
law); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 (2000) (noting
that "[p]rivileged persons within" the attorney-client privilege include "agents of the law-
yer who facilitate the representation").
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 & cmt. c (2000).
50. Id. § 123 (establishing that law firm employees who are not attorneys owe duties
of confidentiality as agents of the lawyer). However, the knowledge of a non-lawyer em-
ployee is not imputed to subsequent firms for which the non-lawyer employee may work.
Id. Even though there is no imputation of knowledge to the new law firm, any actual
sharing of knowledge is prohibited. See id. § 124 (discussing situations in which the impu-
tation is removed).
51. See Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1994) (holding
that screening a legal assistant from a case eliminated the need to disqualify a law firm).
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a client in a particular situation, the firm must have a way of identi-
fying which situations may call for such procedures.
d. Attorneys for Other Parties
Law firm membership is very fluid.52 Because an adverse lawyer
or a lawyer representing a client with a potentially conflicting inter-
est might join a law firm at any time, firms need to track which
attorneys represent opposing or potentially conflicting interests.
e. Business Interests of Attorneys and Staff
When a firm member has an interest in a business venture that
competes with a client, the possibility of impermissible conflict is
evident.5 3 Even when the firm member has a business interest that
is at present aligned with that of the client, a potential for a harm-
ful conflict exists. For example, if an attorney is a shareholder in a
corporate client, the attorney may be in a position to benefit from
shareholder litigation asserting that the client violated securities
laws by failing to disclose important information.-4
f. Adverse Parties
Representation in related matters can be easily overlooked if an
adverse party is not tracked. For example, a potential conflict
arises if one lawyer in a firm has sued an adverse party for damages
and the adverse party consults with another firm member regard-
ing asset protection planning.
52. See Robert W. Hillman, Professional Partnerships, Competition, and the Evolution
of Firm Culture: The Case of Law Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061, 1065-66 (2001) (discussing
the mercurial nature of a law firm's make up).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNINC LAWYERS § 125 cmt. c
(2000) (discussing personal and financial conflicts of interest).
54. Problems other than pure conflict problems can arise in such circumstances. For
example, a firm attorney may have civil and criminal liability for insider trading based on
knowledge a firm member obtains from working on client matters. See Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1 (1997) (prohibiting trading based upon nonpublic
information).
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpub-
lic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any
person who, contemporaneous with the purchase or sale of securities that is the sub-
ject of such violation, has purchased ... or sold ... securities of the same class.
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g. Co-plaintiffs and Co-defendants
Parties who appear to be formally aligned in a litigation matter
with a client may nonetheless have a different objective with re-
gard to representation.5 5 Co-plaintiffs may have potential claims
against each other or may be competing for a limited pool of funds,
such as a small insurance policy.5 6 Conversely, it is common for co-
defendants to assert that another co-defendant should bear all lia-
bility. In fact, plaintiffs often hope that co-defendants will blame
each other for the plaintiffs' damages.
5 7
h. Allies
As with co-parties in litigation, the positions of persons with
seemingly similar interests in transactions may actually differ sig-
nificantly. For example, it is not uncommon for partners to make
different contributions to a partnership. Issues regarding valuation
of partnership interests may arise.58 As well, parent and subsidiary
entities can have differing interests. 59 In the representation of enti-
ties, there is almost always a potential for the constituents of the
entity to have interests that differ from those of the entity.
6°
i. Family Members
Family relationships change suddenly, often with little warning.
Given the risk of divorce, attorneys can never assume that mem-
bers of the same family have identical interests. For example, hus-
bands and wives do not always share the same interests in estate
planning.61 Family members may have differing interests for
purely economic reasons as well. If two family members are in the
same car accident, one might be hurt in a different way and might
require more or less compensation than the other. One family
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d (2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 130 cmt. a, illus. 4 & 5.
59. Id. § 131 cmt. d.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. c, e, & f
(2000).
61. Id. § 130 cmt. c, illus. 1 & 2.
2002]
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
member may even assert a cause of action against another family
member.62
j. Third Parties Financing Representation
In a number of circumstances, non-clients will fund representa-
tion of clients. Such situations include defense of insureds under
an insurance policy or defense of a constituent of an entity. In
these situations, the law includes protections for the client against
the influence that the third party attempts to exercise by virtue of
the power of the purse.63
Clearly, there are numerous parties whose relationships may cre-
ate conflicts of interest for a party. In order to avoid such conflicts,
all of these relationships and interests must be considered.
2. When Interest Needs to Be Evaluated
The timing of the evaluation of potential conflicts of interests is
very important. The disciplinary rules require disclosure of poten-
tial conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of the poten-
tially conflicting representation.64 Certainly, an attorney has a
better chance to take action to avoid an actual conflict, or to de-
cline further representation where appropriate, if the potential for
conflict is detected as early as possible. 65 However, even after the
initial evaluation and commencement of representation, a potential
conflict can occur at any phase of representation.
Some potential conflicts may be obvious simply from knowledge
of the parties whose interests are being compared. To avoid ethical
62. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 801-
807 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the erosion, and in some cases, outright elimination of family
immunities from tort liability).
63. See generally Todd R. Smyth, Duty of Insurer to Pay for Independent Counsel
When Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured and Insurer, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 932, 935-36
(1986) (noting that protections afforded are not consistent from state to state and may be
governed by a combination of statutes, ethics opinions, and case law). Some states view
both the insurer and insured as clients under Model Rule 1.7(a) or (b), while others view
the insurer as a third party paying for the client-insured's legal costs under Model Rule
1.8(f). Id.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 & 2 (2001) (requiring attorneys
to decline to work on matters involving impermissible conflicts and mandating withdrawal
if an impermissible conflict arises during the course of representation).
65. Robin Dearmon, Mechanics and Methods of Conflict of Interest Management, 3
No. 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 8, 9 (1992), WESTLAW 3 NO. 4 LMALR 8.
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violations and malpractice claims, attorneys need to evaluate the
potential for conflicts of interest immediately upon the first contact
with a prospective client, prior to receiving confidential informa-
tion.66 This suggests a need for a preliminary screening of all pro-
spective representations based on the most basic of information,
such as the name of the potential client, obviously adverse parties,
and the general area of concerns involved in representation.67
Once confidential information is obtained from the prospective
client, the matter should be evaluated once again, taking into ac-
count any additional parties whose interest may be involved.
68 If
the prospective client becomes an actual client, the attorney must
assess potential conflicts of interest that arise during the course of
the representation. As new parties in the matter appear, and as the
interests of the client, attorneys, and the firm change, the potential
for conflicts of interest must be addressed again.69 This continuing
need to address potential conflicts of interest is manifested in all
types of representation, litigation or transactional. For example, in
personal injury cases, investigation may reveal new, potentially re-
sponsible, parties. Sources of insurance for payment of a judgment
may also be discovered. In a real estate transaction, a lender may
be added or an engineering firm may be secured to help with anal-
ysis of a site plan. As such parties appear, the potential for con-
flicts of interest between the client and these parties may require
additional evaluation.
Current clients often ask attorneys to take on matters that con-
stitute new representations requiring a different conflict analysis.
Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.'s representation of Enron illustrates this
66. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict ofInterest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
67. See ISBA Mutual, Risk Management, at http://www.isbamutual.com/
riskmanagement/articles/articlel.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (stating that while
avoiding conflicts of interest is furthered by appropriate screening of clients, other mal-
practice claims and ethical violations may be avoided). The prospective client may need a
more experienced or larger firm to handle their matter. Id. Prospective clients who indi-
cate excessive concerns about cost, have a history of changing attorneys, have unrealistic
expectations, seek legal remedies on principle alone, or exhibit irrational behavior or ques-
tionable moral character may cause problems. Id. Prospective clients who have procras-
tinated to the point that claims or defenses must be asserted immediately may also be
difficult to handle. Id.
68. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
69. Id.
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situation very well. In the course of representing Enron, Enron
officials asked Vinson & Elkins to investigate the legality of actions
taken by certain Enron officials.7 0 An Enron employee, recogniz-
ing the potential for conflict, sent a letter suggesting that Vinson &
Elkins not conduct the investigation."1 Nevertheless, Enron hired
the firm to carry out the investigation.7" A spokesman for Vinson
& Elkins stated that the law firm "was not asked to examine [their]
own legal work. '7 3 As the spokesman's comment implies, investi-
gation of the validity of the firm's own legal work would pose a
potential conflict of interest. When a client asks its attorneys to
evaluate the law firm's own work, the attorneys and the firm have a
motive to find that the work was proper, thus avoiding a possible
malpractice claim. Clearly, this presents an avoidable conflict.
A situation that requires a reevaluation of potential conflicts is
the hiring of new lawyers and staff by a law firm. 4 When attorneys
and staff change firms, their new firms need to determine a way to
check potential conflicts stemming from their old firms. A former
firm may quite legitimately refuse to provide potential access to
confidential client information that may be part of a conflicts sys-
tem to an attorney who is no longer associated with that firm. Less
defensible, but a reality nonetheless, is a law firm's refusal to pro-
vide information which may allow the departing attorney to com-
pete with the former firm. If the new firm has tracked opposing
counsel and counsel for other parties in its matters prior to making
a lateral hire, many of these difficulties may be avoided.
3. Acquiring Sufficient Information to Perform the Analysis
Information sufficient to perform a meaningful analysis of po-
tentially conflicting interests can be obtained in a number of ways.
This section considers the advantages and limitations of each of
these methods, explaining how a combination of methods improves
the likelihood that conflicts will be detected. As a starting point,
attorneys and staff members possess some level of knowledge of
70. Bruce Hight, Texas Law Firm Working to Weather Enron Storm, AUSTIN-AMERI-




74. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
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past and present conflicts. With this knowledge, attorneys should
recognize some potential conflicts without consulting other
sources. Attorneys should also impress on staff members the im-
portance of identifying and dealing with conflicts. This instruction
enables staff members to assist attorneys in identifying potential
conflicts.
a. Database and Software Methods75
In general, relying on memory and training alone is not sufficient
to assure that an attorney has the information necessary to avoid
conflicts of interest. A common question on malpractice insurance
applications asks for a description of methods used to avoid con-
flicts.76 Solo attorneys often answer by noting that they rely on
memory alone. Reliance on memory proves dangerous for several
reasons. As an attorney ages or his or her health changes, memory
may become less certain.77 Failure to maintain some type of list of
75. See A.B.A., 1999 Legal Technology Survey Report, 146-47, 300-01 (showing that
54.43% of surveyed firms used conflicts of interest checking software). By category,
53.28% of solo firms used such software, as did 56.10% of small firms averaging five
lawyers, 60% of medium sized firms with an average of 44 lawyers, and 85.71% of large
firms with an average of 239 lawyers. Id. "Database" usually connotes a computerized
method. See Gerry Malone, The Malpractice Crisis: What Can You Do About It?, THE
DOCKET, Jan.-Feb. 1987, reprinted in TEX. LAWYERS' INS. EXCH., Conflict of Interest
Systems, at 1 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). Index card systems are no doubt
still in place in some firms, and when properly used would assist in detection of conflict of
interest issues. Id.; see also LawCommerce.com, Top Legal Software, at http://
www.lawcommerce.com/emarketplace/dir-softwarevendors.asp (last visited Mar. 12,
2002) (providing a hyperlinked list of law office software that may have some of the
features discussed in this section).
76. See TEX. LAWYERS' INS. ExCH., Electronic Forms, at http://www.tlie.org/forms/
newpkg.rft (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (requiring a set of questions for new clients). One
question in particular asks:
22. Does the applicant have written policies regarding avoidance of conflicts of
interest?
[]YES []NO
If yes, provide copies. Please include policies regarding business dealings with clients
and service as an officer or director for a client.
If no, describe the methods used to avoid conflicts of interest, or check which of the
following methods you use:
Memory [ ] Discussion with other firm members [ ] Computer [ ] Index files
[ Interoffice Memos.
Id.
77. See Drkoop.com, Conditions and Concern: Medical Encyclopedia, at http://
www.drkoop.com/conditions/ency/article/003257.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (stating
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parties with potentially conflicting interests could make it difficult
for a solo attorney to join other lawyers in a firm.78 Informal meth-
ods of sharing information, such as simply orally asking the other
attorneys in the firm whether they know of any problems with an-
ticipated representation, become tenuous as more attorneys work
together. Consultation of a list of parties, at the very least, may
reveal the need for additional research or analysis that would not
occur with reliance on memory alone.
The consultation of databases of information regarding parties,
and particularly clients, has become a standard method of con-
ducting "conflicts checks."7 9 These databases are helpful, but are
not foolproof. Consider first the scope of information that is put
into such a database for a firm. As noted above, there are many
types of parties, other than attorneys and clients, who may have
potentially conflicting interests that should be evaluated. Too
often, the database maintained by firms is no more than a client
list.
Some firms rely on their accounting system for conflict informa-
tion.8 Unfortunately, such systems may only include the person
paying the bills, but no information on the client. A field for the
that memory loss can be associated with many causes, including aging, Alzheimer's, head
injuries, strokes, drug and alcohol use, and brain disorders); see also The Online Allergy
Center, Symptoms, at http://www.onlineallergycenter.com/symptoms/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2002) (stating that even allergies can result in short term memory loss).
78. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) (recommending maintenance of a
personal list of clients by all attorneys and staff).
79. Rochelle Cheifetz, Asking All the Right Questions: Researching Possible Conflicts
of Interest, at http://www.llrx.com/extras/conflicts.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). Cheifetz
describes the process her firm followed until they revised their system:
[1] The attorney (or secretary) filled out the Conflict Search Request form and send
(sic) it to the appropriate MIS person.
[2] The names were run through the Conflict Database and the printout was sent back
to the attorney, who would have to review it to see if there were any "conflicts." If
there were, that attorney would contact the responsible attorney for the client posing
the possible "conflict." They would then discuss and clear up the conflict. Waivers
were obtained when necessary.
[3] The Conflict Search Request would then be attached to New Billing Client/Matter
Form and find its way to Accounting, where a client/matter number would be assigned
and the data input into the Accounting System, which fed into the Conflict Database.
Id.
80. See id. (stating that the firm relied on the accounting system for entry of conflict
information).
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description of the matter might include the style of the case, and
thus adverse parties. However, in an audit conducted by one of the
authors of this Article, the space for adverse parties was limited so
"et al." was commonly used in lieu of listing all parties to the litiga-
tion. Such a database falls short of the type necessary to reveal the
basic information needed to evaluate the potential for conflicts of
interest.
A conflicts database should contain detailed information about
clients, as well as information about non-clients, when appropriate.
Generalized contact management software allows entry of contacts
of many types, and could conceivably be used to store a conflicts
database.81 However, such software may have to be customized to
allow entry of the complex relationships that may be involved in
legal representation. Case management software may also be of
use in the conflicts checking process. This software -often contem-
plates searchable entry of witnesses and other persons related to a
representation that might not be entered into a simple client list.
Case management software may be generalized for use by all types
of attorneys, or may be tailored for a narrow practice area.8 2 In a
diversified firm, however, the case management software for one
practice area might not be suitable for other practice areas. If spe-
cialized case management software does not accommodate all ar-
eas of firm practice and cannot be integrated with generalized case
81. Contact management software, which may also go by the names of customer rela-
tions management software ("CRM") or personal information manager ("PIM") describes
a broad range of programs. Ed Poll, CRM Solutions for Small Firm Budgets, at http://
www.lawcommerce.com/smallfirm/qa-edPoll.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) (describing
that such programs attempt to provide the user with physical addresses, phone numbers,
and email addresses for all "contacts"). Common additional features include calendars,
scheduling, and email storage and retrieval. Id. Some of these programs permit the user to
group contacts into classifications with a comment field that could be utilized for conflicts
research. Id. Sophisticated CRM programs also allow analysis of marketing efforts. Id.
Examples of generalized contact management software that might be used by a law firm
include Microsoft Outlook, Act!, and Goldmine. Id.
82. Most generalized case management software is offered by vendors who may offer
other integrated modules, often including a conflicts module. See Abacus Law, What are
the Most Popular Features of Abacus Law,' at http://www.abacuslaw.com (last visited Mar.
30, 2002) (offering both litigation and non-litigation case management modules). Often
the primary purpose of case management software is management of a particular kind of
practice. See also The Plaintiff, Software Specifically for Plaintiff Attorneys, at http://
www.theplaintiff.com/software.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (describing software that
focuses on coordinating information used in a plaintiff attorney's practice).
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management software, the firm may need to consider purchase or
development of conflict of interest software.
For economic efficiency and encouragement of proper use of
conflict checking software, any conflict checking software should
be integrated with other firm software. For example, if the name of
a client is entered into the system in order to set up a file for the
client, that name should not have to be reentered into another sys-
tem to allow future conflict checking. Ideally, accounting, billing,
case management, and conflict checking software packages should
allow seamless sharing of information.83
Whether conflicts reviews are conducted using a manual or com-
puterized system, their effectiveness depends largely on the data
included in the system and the diligence of attorneys in following
established procedures. It is commonly said that "a conflicts check
can only be as good as the information entered in the system.
'84
Various cases illustrate how insufficient or incorrect information
contributes to a firm's failing to detect conflicts during routine
checks. Conflicts cases involving information mistakes or lapses in-
clude situations involving data entry errors, such as misspellings of
names. In one unreported Texas case, an attorney-arbitrator ran a
conflicts check on the parties involved in arbitration.8 5 Unfortu-
nately, the attorney erroneously used the name "Texacoma" in-
stead of "Texakoma," the proper name of the party.86 Because of
the misspelling, the conflicts check did not reveal that the attor-
ney's firm previously represented a client in litigation against
Texakoma.87
83. See generally Steven Schmidt, PCLawPro Version 5.51, at http://www.pclaw.com/
news/lot-pclawpro_2001.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (reporting that "a law firm should
only have to enter information once .... [niot once in case management software, then
once in time and billing software and once more in accounting software"). "However, the
problem with software that does everything is it usually doesn't accomplish individual tasks
as well as more specialized software." Id.
84. Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Veritg: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth
About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 322 (1997).
85. Judd v. Texakoma Oil & Gas Corp., No. 05-99-0039-CV, slip op., 2000 WL 19534,
at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
86. Id. at *2.
87. See id. at *4 (noting that the court, in concluding that the adverse interest should
have been disclosed, set aside the arbitration award, because, in the court's opinion, the
failure to disclose evidenced partiality).
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Sophisticated technology can compensate for certain types of
database errors. For example, the use of soundex searches helps
avoid certain types of name confusion.88 Soundex searches rely
upon phonetic similarity of names rather than exact spelling.89 For
example, searching for "Smith" using a soundex method will find
"Smyth," "Smithe," and "Schmidt."90 However, soundex searches
do not find all possible misspellings of names, and in some circum-
stances may return voluminous results. Still, combinations of tech-
nology in data retrieval software can minimize the errors that may
find their way into databases.
In addition, lag time in the entry of information creates obstacles
in using the database. Some of this problem may be alleviated with
appropriate controls, but not all lag time can be overcome in this
manner. For example, the firm could prevent billing a client until
completion of a conflicts check. No control, however, can address
all possibilities, such as the need of attorneys to input names of
their new spouses or new investments.
Maintenance of attorney investment information in a database
could be a sensitive issue for a law firm. An argument can be made
that investments in publicly traded companies do not usually pose
a risk of a conflict claim. As discussed below, the risk of a serious
conflict grows as the size of firm member holdings increase. Re-
gardless of the size of interest, the database should indicate when
firm members are officers, directors, trustees, or employees of
entities.91
The scope of information included in the database affects how
well it helps to avoid conflict claims. One article recommends
88. See Conflict Checker Software, at http://www.seabill.com/cc.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2002) (using "Sound Alike Sleuth" to find "names that sound like other names, even if
the spelling is different").
89. See EMILY ANNE CROOM, THE GENEALOGIST'S COMPANION AND SOURCEBOOK
16 (1994) (noting that soundex coding was first developed to assist in indexing census infor-
mation in 1880). Soundex coding recognizes that there are six consonant groups with very
similar sounds and that all the vowels are frequently confused. Id. The consonants y, w,
and h are ignored unless they are the first letter of a name. Id. Doubled letters and letters
repeated from the same group are ignored. Id.
90. Robin Dearmon, Mechanics and Methods of Conflict of Interest Management, 3
No. 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 8, 8 (1992), WESTLAW 3 NO. 4 LMALR 8.
91. RONALD E. MALLEN, THE LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE INSURANCE 77 (Robert J. Romero ed., 1999) (explaining that claims directly
arising out of such positions are usually excluded by malpractice insurance). Coverage for
law services to such entities may be excluded as well. Id.
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twenty different pieces of information that should be recorded in a
central database for each client, with additional information re-
quired for entities, attorneys and staff, and key vendors for the law
firm.92 Although a database requiring too much information could
slow firm processes unnecessarily, thorough and comprehensive in-
formation "makes it much easier to quickly assess the seriousness
of a potential conflict. '9 3 A database is often only a starting point
for analyzing the potential for conflict. For example, in a situation
where the database reveals that a proposed client wants the attor-
ney to sue a current client of the firm, the disciplinary rules gener-
ally do not require that the attorney refuse to engage in the
proposed representation if there is no substantial relationship be-
tween the two matters.94 In such a situation, the database simply
indicates a need for analysis of other information, such as firm files
and information that firm members working on the matter have
obtained informally.
Perhaps the most difficult type of potential conflict to identify
through a database is a positional conflict. A positional conflict is
one in which clients, whose interests are not otherwise adverse, are
affected differently by different interpretations of the law.95 The
classic example of a positional conflict is one in which one client of
the firm takes one position on appeal and another client takes the
opposite position.96 While such conflicts may not rise to a level
where they require action under the disciplinary rules, it is not un-
common for corporate clients to demand that law firms refrain
from representing competing positions, regardless of whether the
92. A.B.A. LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 80, 81 (2d
ed. 1999). The suggested information includes client name, social security number, matter
name, attorneys and staff members who work on the matter, a description of the matter,
known parties with conflicting or potentially conflicting interests and their relation to the
client, other professionals serving the client, file status, opposing counsel, date file opened,
date representation commenced, file number, date conflict check requested, date initial
conflict check cleared, firm member confirming conflict check, date of file closing and de-
struction, date representation ended, and comments. Id. at 80.
93. Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Conflict of Interest Systems, at http:/
/www.osbplf.org/index.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) (discussing the need to include each
party's relationship to the matter).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2001).
95. See generally John Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV.
457, 460 (1993) (describing common positional conflicts of interest situations).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. f, illus. 5 &
6 (2000).
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disciplinary rules mandate disclosure and consent.97 Not only will
computers fail to determine all the positions that have or will be
taken by different clients, but the entry of all potential legal posi-
tions is simply impossible.98
Limiting practice to narrow areas can reduce the chance of posi-
tional conflicts for some law firms. For example, if a firm only de-
fends or prosecutes personal injury actions, the firm reduces the
chance that it will take opposing positions interpreting statutes of
limitation. However, the possibility of conflicts is not entirely elim-
inated. In pursuing a cross claim, a defense firm may need to assert
that the statute of limitation has not run in a particular case. Con-
versely, a counterclaim against a plaintiff may force a plaintiffs'
firm to consider a statute of limitation defense that is contrary to
the legal positions taken on behalf of other clients.
More and more firms are engaging in research beyond data con-
tained in firm databases and files. Some law firms now research
clients in a number of ways, including performing background and
credit checks, or monitoring certain external databases for evi-
dence of potentially conflicting interests. These efforts help fill in
gaps as clients often give less than complete information to their
lawyers, sometimes out of ignorance or negligence, and sometimes
intentionally. The volume of information available regarding cor-
porate clients may warrant use of external data.99 External
databases can directly update or supplement in-house conflict
97. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Client Conflict Software: No Panacea, NAT'L L.J., July 21,
1997, at 13A.
98. Cf. Jett Hanna, Loss Prevention for AnyLawFirm.com, 5 LPL ADVISORY 2, (ABA
Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Prof'l Liab.) Fall 2001, at 3 (on file with the St. Mary' Law
Journal) (indicating that computers can perform legal analysis, as well as help sort out the
various positions taken by clients). E.g., Texas Last Will & Testament, at www.txwills.com/
(last visited Mar. 17, 2002) (allowing a client to answer questions and receive a will after
answering a series of questions). However, such software does not perform a complete
legal analysis under every conceivable scenario. Id. Exceptions to an expected pattern of
answers prevent the client from receiving a will. Id.
99. Robin Dearmon, Mechanics and Methods of Conflict of Interest Management, 3
No. 4 LEGAL MALPRAC'ICE REPORT 8, 9 (1992), WESTLAW 3 NO. 4 LMALR 8 (sug-
gesting that Dun & Bradstreet databases may be useful in researching potential corporate
conflicts); see also Rochelle Cheifetz, Asking All the Right Questions: Researching Possible
Conflicts of Interest, at http://www.llrx.com/extras/conflicts.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002)
(stating that "[w]e had to explain [to attorneys] why we had to research a particular com-
pany and its subsidiaries so the process would take longer than before").
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software. 100 Interestingly, a recent discussion with an ethics part-
ner at a large Midwest law firm indicated that outside research of
clients and interests has become an important part of that firm's
conflicts avoidance procedures. 10'
One author recently opined that "[n]ew conflict-tracking
software must be further developed to overtake the database as the
primary computerized means of tracking client conflicts." ' 2 This
recommendation appears to confuse the software that utilizes
databases with the data in the databases. Databases are collections
of data that can be accessed, updated, compared, and analyzed by
software, but are distinct from programs and software.
10 3
Databases contain the raw information upon which software per-
forms manipulations. Undoubtedly, the manner in which the data
is manipulated by software to assist conflict analysis can be im-
proved, but the logic of such manipulations still depends upon
models of analysis developed by humans and translated into
software. "[S]oftware is a tool and not a solution," and human fac-
tors will continue to affect the functioning of all conflict avoidance
measures.1
0 4
100. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Client Conflict Software: No Panacea, NAT'L L.J., July 21,
1997, at A13 (stating that a representative of one software company providing conflicts
software indicated that "new versions of the software may allow the data to be updated
continuously via a Dun & Bradstreet or Standard & Poor's news service").
101. As with some of the information in this Article based on law firm audits, the
actual source of this information is being kept confidential.
102. Andrew J. Drucker, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solutions to Conflict Track-
ing and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Expansion of the Larger Law Firm, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 561 (1999). A software manufacturer, Accutrac, provided much of
Drucker's analysis. See id. (relying on information obtained from an Accutrac representa-
tive). Drucker describes a computerized "Chinese Wall" analogous to common security
schemes which limits users of the network to only those files they need to perform their
work. Id. Describing Accutrac software as having the ability to "alert the firm to a poten-
tial conflict of interest before it occurs" simply states what any conflict system should do.
Id.
103. See Webopedia, database, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/database.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (offering a definition of "database"). "Database" is defined as:
"(1) A collection of information organized in such a way that a computer program can
quickly select desired pieces of data" and "(2) ... shorthand for database management
system." Id.
104. Andrew J. Drucker, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solutions to Conflict Track-
ing and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Expansion of the Larger Law Firm, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 561 n.234 (1999) (quoting Wendy R. Liebowitz, Client Conflict
Software: No Panacea, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1997, at A3). Drucker expresses agreement,
but states that "in time, conflict-tracking software, when used in conjunction with other
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b. Firm Discussion of Matters: New Matter Memoranda
This section of the Article began by noting that the knowledge
and memory of individual attorneys and staff cannot assure proper
conflict detection. However, given the limitations of conflicts of
interest software, knowledge and memory must not be ignored. As
one general counsel for a large law firm put it, "I don't know what
kind of software you could ever purchase that would replace that
intake meeting every week." 105 Firms can use a number of meth-
ods to tap this reservoir of personal knowledge and institutional
memory.
In smaller firms, daily or weekly conferences where lawyers dis-
cuss potential and pending matters can help avoid conflict situa-
tions. One attorney may identify a problem which another
attorney does not have sufficient information or insight to recog-
nize. As firm size increases, however, circulation of new matter




Typically, all attorneys in a firm are to review memos outlining
potential new representations to confirm that they do not perceive
a potential problem with the representation. The circulation of a
conflicts memorandum provides additional protection because in-
dividual attorneys may be able to recognize conflicts not revealed
in checking data in either a manual or computer system. In under-
scoring the importance of conflicts memoranda, one court ex-
plained that "[tihere is no substitute for the actual circulation of
conflicts memos to determine whether [there] are any disqualifying
conflicts that do not appear in the computer database."'17
Of course, circulation of new matter memoranda is only effective
if all attorneys in the firm seriously review them.108 Difficulties in
methods and devices ... will represent an ideal solution." Id. Drucker addresses "intake
sheets," but appears to confuse client information provided at intake with new matter
memoranda. See id. at 559 (describing the basics of "intake sheets").
105. The source of this information is being kept confidential.
106. See A.B.A. LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 80
(2d ed. 1999) (noting guidelines to prevent conflicts of interest).
107. In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578, 587 n.8 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997).
108. See A.B.A. LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRATICE 82
(2d ed. 1999) (recommending review of "new matter sheets" by all attorneys and staff
within twenty-four hours). The authors know that this is not the common manner of deal-
ing with new matter memoranda in larger firms, though it may work in a smaller firm.
More typical is a rule that assumes there are no conflict objections if no attorney has
voiced objections within a certain time period.
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the circulation process may render new matter memoranda impo-
tent in certain circumstances. For example, an attorney on vaca-
tion may have insight regarding a particular situation that will have
to await his return to the office. Similarly, the urgency of situations
may require that an attorney begins representation before all attor-
neys respond to a new matter memorandum. Consequently, new
matter memoranda should be viewed only as a partial cure for the
inadequacies of databases. Obviously, all resources should be uti-
lized to detect potential conflicts of interests. While reliance on
memory alone becomes less viable due to the vast number of par-
ties and relationships that a law firm encounters, computer
software is not infallible either. A law firm should combine the
strengths of the available software with human efforts to gain the
best probability of avoiding conflict situations.
4. Analysis Process
Once the parties with potentially conflicting interests have been
identified, someone must analyze the conflict. Analysis of a con-
flict involves evaluating:
1. All potential or actual conflicts;
2. The consequences of proceeding in light of the existence of a
conflict;
3. Possible steps to address conflicts; and
4. The effectiveness of steps to avoid the consequences of
conflicts.
This suggested analysis is somewhat broader than the minimum
required by the disciplinary rules.10 9 Such an approach reflects the
need to take into account all firm goals. Even when no actual con-
flict exists under the disciplinary rules, allegations of conflicts of
interest can aggravate a malpractice claim based on a simple mis-
take or on oral discussions between an attorney and client.
Proper analysis of conflicts ultimately relies upon the analytical
capabilities and good intentions of the persons performing the
evaluation. Therefore, the training and education of the person
performing the analysis is always imperative. Performing a correct
109. See generally Marilyn Lindgren Cohen, Do You Have a Conflict? Take This Self-
Quiz to Find Out, 56 OR. ST. BAR. BULL. 33 (1996), WESTLAW 56-MAY ORSBB33 (pro-
viding an example of a disciplinary rule-driven analysis).
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analysis may require knowledge of reference materials and access
to those materials.
When a conflict analysis is performed within a law firm, firm re-
sources can enhance the opportunity for correct analysis. Firm re-
sources may include review of conflict analysis by a senior attorney
or an ethics partner. In various situations, review by an expert
outside the firm may be advisable. °10 If the firm does not have
procedures for determining when conflict analysis is reviewed, the
analysis that occurs, by default, is that of the individual attorney or
staff member who faces the situation.
5. Appropriate Responses to Analysis
If a potential conflict exists, attorneys may choose from a range
of responses. In some cases, the disciplinary rules mandate rejec-
tion of a proposed representation. As well, state or federal law
may prohibit dual representation in certain criminal matters."' In
some situations, consent to conflicts of interest may not be an op-
tion for a client. Governmental clients may not be able to consent
to conflicts of interest." 2 Similarly, parties who are adversaries in
litigation, such as divorcing spouses, cannot validly consent to con-
110. See A.B.A., Center for Professional Responsibility, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
202report.html (last visited Mar. 22. 2002) (noting that the ABA House of Delegates re-
cently passed a version of comments to Model Rule 1.6). The revision reads as follows:
[7] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing con-
fidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these
Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be im-
pliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the dis-
closure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(2) permits such disclosure because
of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Id. The ethical posture of informal consultation with an outside attorney, or an expert such
as a law professor, has been the subject of significant discussion. Whether the relationship
between the outside attorney or expert is treated as an attorney-client relationship in the
absence of formal engagement is not entirely clear. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (1998) (treating informal consulting as an attorney-cli-
ent relationship in some respects, but not others); Jett Hanna, Moonlighting Law Profes-
sors: Identifying and Minimizing the Professional Liability Risk, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 421,
434-44 (2001) (arguing that professors, when not explicitly engaged as attorneys, are simi-
lar to legal assistants and treated as such under rules of agency, unauthorized practice
statutes, and disciplinary rules).
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g
(2000) (discussing when representation is prohibited by law).
112. See id. (explaining the extent to which a government client may consent to a
conflict of interest).
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flicts. 11 3 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
provides that consent is not effective in other circumstances where
"it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide
adequate representation to one or more of the clients." '114 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct embody a similar concept:
"[A] client may consent to representation notwithstanding a con-
flict[;] .. .however[,] .. .when a disinterested lawyer would con-
clude that the client should not agree to the representation under
the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the cli-
ent's consent."'
1 15
In other situations, nothing forces attorneys and firms to accept
representation simply because a strong case can be made that the
disciplinary rules permit proposed representation. An attorney can
reject a proposed representation simply because the potential con-
flict makes him uneasy. "Based on concern about a conflict of in-
terest under self-imposed standards more exacting than (the
Restatement standards), a lawyer ordinarily may decline a repre-
sentation ...or withdraw." '16 Similarly, if a conflict situation
arises during the course of representation, the attorney is required.
to withdraw in certain circumstances," 7 and may withdraw if the
client is not prejudiced, even when withdrawal is not mandated.' 8
Disciplinary rules may permit the use of certain types of mecha-
nisms to avoid the consequences of potential or actual conflicts of
interest. Disciplinary rules require disclosure of the existence of
potential conflicts and consent to the representation by the af-
fected clients in the following situations: conflicts with a lawyer's
financial or other interests; 19 business transactions between a law-
113. See id. (commenting that directly adverse parties cannot consent to joint
representation).
114. Id. § 122 (2)(c).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (2001).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. g (2000).
117. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.16(a) (2001) (stating that if the
representation is illegal or violates disciplinary rules, the lawyer is impaired, or the client
discharges the attorney, the attorney must withdraw).
118. Id. 1.16(b). Model Rule 1.16(b) provides specific grounds for withdrawal, with
the most permissive allowing withdrawal when "a client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." Id. 1.16(b)(3).
119. Id. 1.7(b).
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yer and client; 120 representation of two or more clients in the same
matter;121 or representation of one client in a matter adverse to
another current or former client.
12 2
In some situations, disciplinary rules require written consent by
the client to commencement or continuation of the representa-
tion. 23 Ideally, attorneys should document both the disclosure and
consent whether or not disciplinary rules require such a writing.
1 24
Written communications provide evidence of the disclosure made
while reinforcing the seriousness of the decision to retain an attor-
ney with potentially conflicting interests. Attorneys who find
themselves in a "swearing match" before a fact-finder often dis-
cover that the fact-finder believes a client's version of events. 25
In any situation where a potential conflict deteriorates into an
actual conflict, the attorney must complete the required disclosure
and consultation. Disclosure should be made so that lay clients un-
derstand the communication, even if it is detailed. A careful law-
yer must be cognizant that a defective disclosure renders consent
ineffective.
Screening, popularly called "Chinese Walls," may be used in
some situations to avoid imputation of conflicts of interests when
lawyers change firms. The Restatement only permits screening if:
(1) confidential information communicated to a prohibited lawyer
is unlikely to be significant, (2) screening measures will eliminate
participation in representation by the screened lawyer, and (3) no-
tice of the screening is given to affected clients. 26 Some jurisdic-
tions, and the Model Rules, simply do not recognize Chinese Walls
120. Id. 1.8(a)(1).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2001).
122. Id. 1.7(a), 1.9, 1.11.
123. Id. 1.8(a)(3) (addressing transactions between the attorney and client).
124. Karen K.H. Bell, LAWYERS' PROF'L INDEM. CO., MANAGING CONFLICT OF IN-
TEREST SITUATIONS 13 (1998). This booklet is produced and distributed by the mandatory
insurance program for Ontario lawyers. While the sources of Canadian ethics law obvi-
ously differ in some respects from American law, the differences in conflict avoidance tech-
niques used are minimal.
125. The general public does not hold a high opinion of the legal profession. See
A.B.A., Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System 50 (1999), at http://www.abanet.org/media/
perception/perceptions.pdf (discussing survey results that indicate only 14% of persons
surveyed were extremely or very confident in lawyers). The odds are that only a few attor-
neys will be in any given jury pool, and it is likely that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice
case will use preemptory strikes to eliminate lawyers from the jury panel completely.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2) (2000).
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as sufficient cures for the threat of breach of confidentiality.127 In
addition, deciding to have a Chinese Wall requires effective imple-
mentation. Cracks in the wall may risk both breaching confidenti-
ality and representing conflicting interests.
A potentially unappreciated byproduct of a conflicts analysis is
that a given situation may demonstrate a need for a procedure or
policy to avoid similar conflict situations. Accordingly, law firms
should create procedures to solicit comments from attorneys and
staff regarding problems that do not appear to be addressed by the
conflicts system.
12 8
C. Engagement Letters and Contracts
The adoption of firm policies and procedures requiring docu-
mentation of all representation can avoid conflict claims. 129 The
use of engagement letters and client contracts can prevent future
conflicts. Clients should sign an engagement letter or a contract
which sets forth the services that the attorney will provide and the
manner in which the firm will be compensated.1 30 If a third party is
to pay for the representation, then the third party should receive
notice that the third party is not the client. Other third parties who
are not represented by counsel and who may have some reason to
believe that the attorney is representing their interests should re-
127. See Petroleum Wholesale v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no, writ) (opining that "the erection of a Chinese wall does little to dissipate the
public's perception of the appearance of professional impropriety, because, in the end, the
public has no way of knowing whether a breach in the Chinese wall might ever occur"); see
generally Mark Hansen, Model Rule Rehab: House Tackles Tough Issues as Ethics Debate
Begins, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2001, at 81 (noting that the ABA House of Delegates rejected a
proposal by the ABA Ethics 2000 commission that would amend the Model Rules to allow
screens).
128. Cf. Susan Raridon & Alan P. Levine, How to Implement a Quality Management
Program, 636 P.L.I. 123, 127 (1992), WESTLAW 636 PLI/Comm 123 (suggesting that law
firms should conduct surveys of attorneys, staff, and clients in evaluating the quality of law
firm service).
129. Other types of ethics questions and claims can also be avoided by documenting
the nature of representation. If the scope of representation is properly documented, the
attorney may be able to demonstrate that all requested services were performed in the face
of an allegation that the attorney should have performed additional services. If the fees
are clearly stated at the outset of representation, the client is less likely to balk at paying
fees because of disagreements over what the fee agreement was.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2001) (strongly encouraging the
use of written fee agreements); id. 1.5(b) (stating that fee agreements should be communi-
cated "preferably in writing").
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ceive written notice that they are not clients and that they should
seek other counsel.1 31 In particular, constituents of an entity repre-
sented by an attorney should be advised in writing that they are not
clients if that is the attorney's intention. As well, persons seeking
legal advice who are not, accepted as clients should receive a decli-
nation in writing.
132
Utilizing rigorous procedures to document who is and who is not
a client avoids conflict claims by minimizing the chance that some-
one that an attorney does not consider to be a client will claim that
the attorney represents her interests. Such unintended clients may
present the worst type of conflict threat. Because the attorney
does not consider them to be clients, the attorney will not consider
their interests when checking for and analyzing conflicts.
Controls can assist a firm in assuring proper use of engagement
letters and fee contracts within the firm. In a firm where hourly
billing is the norm,. prevention of entry of billable time without
confirmation of the existence of the fee agreement or engagement
letter may be possible. Promulgation of standard engagement let-
ters, fee agreements, disclaimers of representation, and declination
letters can help firms avoid repetition of difficult situations and
provide attorneys with resources to keep documentation require-
ments from becoming too onerous.
III. COMMON CONFLICT CLAIMS
While conflicts of interests arise in a vast variety of situations,
one common thread is the risk that the attorney-client relationship
will suffer ill effects as a result of competing interests. 133 As de-
fined in the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, "[a]
conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the
131. See id. 4.3 (stating that "[w]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct misunderstanding). The Model Rule does not mandate
a writing, but does require a lawyer to correct misunderstandings of the attorney's role. Id.
132. See THE QUALITY PURSUIT: ASSURING STANDARDS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
107 (Robert J. Conroy et al. eds., 1989) (suggesting that lawyers who decline representa-
tion should write a very precise non-engagement letter).
133. See GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.4 (2001)
(stating that "a conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney-client relationship or the
quality of the representation is 'at risk,' even if no substantive impropriety-such as a
breach of confidentiality or less than zealous representation-in fact eventuates").
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lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and ad-
versely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's
duties to another current client, a former client, or a third per-
son. "134  Using this definition, conflicts fall into three categories:
(1) conflicts between the attorney's interests and client's interests,
(2) conflicts between and among clients, and (3) conflicts involving
third party interference with the attorney-client relationship. From
these categories, this Article identifies common conflicts that are
difficult to defend. 135 Following a brief description of each type of
conflict, this section suggests measures for detecting and dealing
with particular conflict situations.
A. Conflicts Involving Attorneys' Entrepreneurial Activities
Without doubt, the most difficult conflicts to defend are those
conflicts where the attorney's personal interest conflicts with client
interests. As explained by counsel to the insurer providing mal-
practice coverage to the nation's largest law firms, "entrepreneurial
activity by the lawyer or the law firm complicates an already diffi-
cult defense task ... [because plaintiffs can] seize on such activities
to support their claims that the defendants were careless, distracted
lawyers, influenced by a personal profit motive and other conflicts
of interest. ' 136 The fundamental concern with such activities is that
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000).
135. See Mark C.S. Bassingthwaighte & Robert D. Reis, The Top Ten Malpractice
Traps & How to Avoid Them, MONT. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 11, WESTLAW 25-JAN MTLAW
7 (listing the most common conflicts of interest situations). The identification of particu-
larly "troublesome" conflicts was based on the authors' own experiences in monitoring and
reviewing hundreds of legal malpractice cases and grievances in which conflicts of interest
were challenged. See also Mark C.S. Bassingthwaight & Robert D. Reis, The Top Ten
Malpractice Traps & How to Avoid Them, MONT. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 11, WESTLAW 25-
JAN MTLAW 7 (listing the following conflicts as the most common and potentially dan-
gerous: (1) "[r]epresentation of two parties in a matter," (2) "[r]epresentation of opposing
theories of law for different but similarly situated clients," (3) "[r]epresentation of oppos-
ing sides of an issue, even though the clients are not involved with one another," (4)
"[p]ersonal involvement in a client's business interests," (5) "[s]ervice as a director or of-
ficer of a client company," (6) "[a]n unclear statement of non-representation in situations
where a clear conflict of interest exists," and (7) "conflicts arising from law firm acquisi-
tions and lateral hires").
136. Loss Prevention Manual of Attorney's Liability Assurance Society, Tab 11 (1996),
reprinted in Robert E. O'Malley, Serving on Client Boards/Doing Business with Clients, at
the ABA 22nd National Conference on Professional Responsibility (May 30-June 1, 1996)
(on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
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"the lawyer's independence, objectivity and judgment will be-or
will be perceived to be-seriously compromised.
137
When entrepreneurial activities give rise to conflicts of interest
claims, juries recognize the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship. 38 Court opinions describe attorneys as fiduciaries of
the "highest order," who "owe their clients utmost good faith, fi-
delity, and trust when carrying out the performance of legal ser-
vices. "139 A basic tenet of fiduciary law is that the fiduciary should
not benefit at the expense of the client. 140 Anytime an attorney
enters a business transaction with a client, there is a risk of over-
reaching due to the attorney's legal skill and training, as well as the
client's trust and confidence. 4' To avoid abuse, disciplinary rules
require that attorneys take special precautions relating to business
transactions with clients. 42 If an attorney is accused of violating
137. Id. at 4.
138. A jury charge will rely on state law for defining "fiduciary" or "fiduciary duty."
See COMM. ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGE PJC 104.1 (2000) (providing a charge example stating that "a relationship of trust
and confidence existed if Paul Payne justifiably placed trust and confidence in Don Davis
to act in Paul Payne's best interest"). More guidance may be given in the charge if desired.
See generally Charge of the Court, in Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l v. Fulbright & Jaworski, No.
401, 464-A (333rd Judicial Dist., Travis County, Tex. Feb. 27, 1989) (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal) (defining "fiduciary relationship" to include "those informal relations
which exist whenever one party trusts and relies upon another, as well as technical fiduci-
ary relations[, and providing that] .... [t]he relationship between an attorney and his client
is highly fiduciary in nature").
139. Bruce Zucker, Attorneys Who Enter into Business Transactions with Their Cli-
ents: A Presumption of Undue Influence, Malpractice, and Impropriety, 1 J. LEGAL AD-
VOC. & PRAC. 7, 7-8 (1999); see also In re Lowther, 611 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1981) (opining
that attorneys doing business with clients is "wrought with pitfalls and traps and the [c]ourt
is without choice other than to hold the attorney to the highest of standards").
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2001) (noting that the
lawyer's interests should not adversely affect those of the client).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt. b (2000).
142. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys engaging in business
transactions with clients must comply with the general conflict provisions under Model
Rule 1.7 and the more specific provisions of Model Rule 1.8(a). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8(a) (2001). Model Rule 1.8(a) prohibits an attorney from entering
into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, pos-
sessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client
in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) the client is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction;
and (3) the client consents in writing thereto.
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
applicable rules relating to business transactions with clients, "the
burden of persuasion is on the lawyer to show that the transaction
was fair and reasonable and that the client was adequately in-
formed. '143 In a legal malpractice case alleging breach of fiduciary
duty, the plaintiff can rely on the "well-established presumption of
undue influence when lawyers engage in business transactions with
clients. ' 144 This presumption "can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the transaction was fair, (2) full disclo-
sure was made to the client, and (3) [the client] had the opportu-
nity to seek the advice of independent counsel. 1' 45 If the attorney
cannot successfully rebut the presumption of undue influence, the
court can declare the transaction void, and the attorney can be held
liable for a breach of fiduciary duty.
146
Another significant risk of engaging in business dealings with cli-
ents relates to the fact that malpractice claims associated with such
transactions may not be covered under the attorney's professional
liability policy. Depending on the plaintiff's allegations and the
term of the applicable policy, the insurer may deny coverage on the
basis that the claims are not covered under the insuring agree-
ments, which limit coverage to claims arising out of acts or omis-
sions in rendering legal services to others. If the plaintiff alleges
some conflict in rendering legal services, the insurer may rely on
policy exclusions that eliminate coverage for claims relating to bus-
iness activities of attorneys, regardless of whether the claim arises
out of the rendering of legal services. 47 Some underwriters in-
clude broad business pursuit exclusions because of their concern
over the exposure when attorneys wear two hats, as well as because
of the difficulty in determining when the attorney was acting as a
business person and when the attorney was serving as legal coun-
sel. This determination need not be made if the policy includes a
broad business pursuit exclusion that eliminates coverage for all
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2001).
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt. a (2000).
144. Anne E. Thar, Taking an Equity Interest in a Client-Is It Worth the Risk?, 89 ILL.
B.J. 101, 102 (2001).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Home Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 854 F. Supp. 458, 461 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
a "business pursuits" exclusion precluded coverage for claims arising from a loan transac-
tion involving a savings and loan association owned by the insured-attorneys).
[Vol. 33:669
AVOIDING LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
claims relating to attorneys' business dealings. In discussing how a
business pursuit exclusion may jeopardize insurance coverage, le-
gal malpractice expert Ronald E. Mallen explains that it is a "'sta-
tus exclusion"' that "'turns on the ownership interest, not the
activity.' "148
Despite the liability exposure and insurance risks associated with
engaging in business activities with clients, many attorneys cannot
resist the temptation.1 49 These transactions take numerous forms.
Common business transactions involving clients include loans to
and from clients and attorneys taking an equity position in a busi-
ness venture as a fee. 150 When an attorney takes stock in lieu of a
fee, the attorney faces a conflict between professional interests as
the company's attorney and the attorney's personal interests as a
company shareholder.5  Conflicts also arise out of attorney invest-
ments in the same venture with a client or investments in a venture
that is adverse to a client's interests. Regardless of the specific
form of conflicts, all entrepreneurial activities involving clients can
leave the "entrepreneurial" attorney exposed to disciplinary and
civil liability, and the firm, and possibly firm partners, exposed to
vicarious liability.
Given the possible consequences of entrepreneurial activities,
firms should take steps to identify and address conflicts regarding
business dealings related to clients. While many firms have exten-
sive procedures to avoid potential problems related to representing
148. Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36, 40
(quoting Ronald E. Mallen) (explaining that many firms that invest in client businesses do
so without considering the insurance consequences).
149. Id. at 36. During the "dot-com" frenzy many attorneys acquired interests in cli-
ents' initial public offerings. See id. (noting that the "staggering profits in the IPO market
are driving an increasing number of law firms to take their chances on soon-to-be public
clients"). Ironically, market pressures even caused some legal malpractice insurers to "re-
lax" their condemnation of such investments. Id. at 41 (citing a loss-prevention counsel
with the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, the company that insures many of the na-
tion's largest law firms). Ironically, when the client's business goes sour, the investing at-
torneys not only take a "financial hit," but face conflict of interest claims from the client
and third parties looking for a deep pocket. Id. at 39 (citing Ronald E. Mallen, co-author
of the treatise LEGAL MALPRACTICE).
150. John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest: Business Transactions with Clients, Wyo.
LAW., Oct. 1998, at 13.
151. See Ronald C. Minkoff, Ethical Considerations for Attorneys Involved in Venture
Capital Transactions, 1267 P.L.I. 917, 920 (2001), WESTLAW 580 PLI/Lit 1029 (noting that
"[t]he dominant ethical concern is that the lawyer will improperly use the professional
relationship to induce the client to act in a manner which may benefit the lawyer").
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different clients with conflicting interests, firms are far less likely to
have procedures to identify potential conflicts between the inter-
ests of clients and the personal financial interests of firm attor-
neys.152 Without such procedures, the firm and its attorneys will
not be prepared to identify and address these serious conflicts of
interest.
Clearly, risk management should include formulating a firm pol-
icy that specifically deals with entrepreneurial activities of firm at-
torneys. Attorneys representing each practice area should
participate in drafting the policy which sets forth the firm's position
on business transactions involving clients because attorneys' busi-
ness activities take different forms. A threshold determination is
for firm partners to decide whether business dealings involving cli-
ents will be strictly prohibited or merely regulated. For example,
the partners might wisely decide to prohibit all attorneys from tak-
ing stock in lieu of fees or serving on the board of directors of for-
profit corporations. Short of prohibiting certain activities, the part-
ners may impose restrictions such as requiring firm approval before
an attorney accepts any directorship, trusteeship, or similar office
in any private or public organization.153
One other restriction that limits malpractice exposure is impos-
ing a ceiling on the maximum ownership interest that the firm or its
attorneys can obtain in a client business. Arguably, when firm "in-
152. Stanley Keller, Tax, Business, and Succession Planning for the Growing Com-
pany, 71 A.L.I. 407, 420 (1997), WESTLAW SB71 ALI-ABA 407. A 1987 survey con-
ducted by the Subcommittee on Quality Control of the ABA Business Law Section ("ABA
Business Law Section Survey") revealed that virtually all respondent firms had "extensive
procedures to avoid potential difficulties when representing different clients with conflict-
ing objectives," but were far less likely to have procedures to identify potential conflicts
between the interest of clients and the personal financial interest of lawyers within the
firm. Id. According to the survey, thirty-one of the fifty respondent firms had formal
policies which either prohibited lawyers in their firm from investing in clients or investing
jointly with clients or require advance approval of such investments. Id.
153. Id. at 421. The ABA Business Law Section Survey revealed that 50% of the
respondent firms forbid or require some form of consent before a firm attorney accepts
any directorship, trusteeship, or similar office of any charity or other not-for profit corpo-
ration. Id. A 1995 mail survey of all Texas law firms with ten or more attorneys revealed
that 68% of the respondent firms required prior approval or simply prohibited firm princi-
pals from serving as officers or directors of for-profit entities. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are
Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Re-
view and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 271, 282-83 (1997) (noting that as expected,
the results also indicated that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to monitor principals'
directorship activities).
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vestments are small, they do not 'make a difference' in a law firm's
behavior. ' 154 This view is reflected in the policy of one Silicon Val-
ley firm which limits investment to $50 thousand or one percent of
the founder's stock in order to avoid the appearance of any effect
on the attorney's legal judgment.155 Above all, the aggregate per-
sonal investments of all firm attorneys should not be of such mag-
nitude to distract a lawyer from giving disinterested, candid legal
advice.'
5 6
Once firm partners have determined what restrictions to impose
on entrepreneurial activities, the policy should specifically describe
the restrictions and the procedures for complying with ethics rules.
Obviously, the specific approach used by firms will depend on their
size and resources. Risk management experts with the firm's mal-
practice carrier can assist attorneys in formulating policies and pro-
cedures that are suitable for their particular firm. For small and
mid-sized firms, a general counsel for one carrier recommends the
following guidelines for attorneys choosing to accept the risks of
business transactions with clients:
(1) Screen the clients in whom you invest carefully;
(2) Require that all partners or a designated conflicts committee
approve each investment;
(3) Require that clients sign a detailed disclosure statement cov-
ering all points discussed in ABA Formal Opinion 00-418,
Acquiring Ownership in a Client in Connection with Per-
forming Legal Services;
(4) Decline stock options in lieu of fees;
(5) Set a limit on the amount of each investment, such as an
agreement of no more than five percent ownership interest
in a single client;
154. See Bruce Dallas & Heather Stack, Securities Law & the Internet: Doing Busi-
ness in a Rapidly Changing Marketplace, 1188 PLI 233, 255 (2000), WESTLAW 1188 PLI/
Corp 233 (suggesting that the impact of a particular company's success or failure is minimal
if investments are made through a firm fund rather than being made by individual
attorneys).
155. Id. at 256.
156. ROBERT E. O'MALLEY, New Clients/New Matters, in THE QUALITY PURSUIT, As-
SURING STANDARDS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 104, 110 (Robert Michael Greene ed.,
1989).
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(6) Consider requiring that investments be made by the firm
rather than by individuals;
(7) Require that investments be held for a minimum period; and
(8) Review the legal malpractice policy, recognizing that some
policy exclusions are only triggered by ownership interests
exceeding a specific percentage ownership.
157
As noted in Part II, the conflicts system regularly used by the
firm should also include information on certain investments of firm
attorneys. Without such information in the system, a conflicts
check alone will not reveal if a firm attorney has an interest ad-
verse to a prospective or current client. As an additional safe-
guard, circulation of a "new client matter memo" to all firm
attorneys will give each attorney an opportunity to recognize when
she has an investment or other interest adverse to that of a client
which should be revealed.
Regardless of the size of the firm, policies and procedures should
identify a specific ethics partner or committee to be responsible for
monitoring all attorney entrepreneurial activities involving clients.
A designated ethics partner or committee can provide scrutiny, ob-
jectivity, and distance in evaluating when and how firm attorneys
participate in entrepreneurial activities related to clients.
Most importantly, the ethics counsel or committee should devote
time to educating firm members so that they can intelligently spot
and avoid conflicts of interest problems related to entrepreneurial
activities. While different educational approaches can be used, the
goal remains to deputize each attorney to detect and avoid
conflicts.
A few reported cases illustrate how conflict traps related to en-
trepreneurial activities could have been avoided through education
and improvements in the ethical infrastructure of the firm provid-
ing the legal services. The first case deals with attorney investment
in a venture adverse to clients and the second involves attorney
investment in the same venture with a client. The third case in-
157. See Anne E. Thar, Taking an Equity Interest in a Client-Is It Worth the Risk?, 89
ILL. B.J. 101, 102 (2001) (concluding that the guidelines will "at least improve the odds" of
gambling and investing in a client, even though it is not a bet the author would be willing to
take).
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volves an attorney who borrowed money from a client and his
firm's subsequent vicarious liability.
State v. Callahan"8 is a disciplinary case arising out of a sale of
real property in which John Callahan acted as the attorney for both
the buyer and seller-complainant.1 59 In upholding the indefinite
suspension of the attorney, the Supreme Court of Kansas identified
a number of improprieties, including the fact that the attorney did
not disclose to the seller the attorney's close business ties to the
buyer.160 By failing to decline the engagement, the attorney cre-
ated the appearance that his legal judgment was impaired by his
personal investment interests.1 6 1 Ethics education might have
helped this attorney appreciate the risks of representing a buyer
whose interests were adverse to the attorney's investment partner.
Had information on the attorney's personal investments been in-
cluded in the firm's conflicts system, the potential conflict could
have been detected when the conflicts check was completed.
By adopting policies and following procedures related to invest-
ment ventures with clients, attorneys might have avoided the con-
flicts of interest claims made against them in K.M.A. Associates,
Inc. v. Meros.162 In K.M.A., an attorney and his partner "bailed
out" a time-share project owned by the client. 163 In an attempt to
help their client with financing, the defendant-attorney and his law
partner entered into a partnership agreement with the client. 16
4
Under the agreement, the investors organized by the attorney ac-
quired fifty percent interest in the project.165 Through a series of
loans and transactions, the attorney eventually acquired all of the
assets of the partnership. 66
On appeal of a summary judgment for the attorneys, the court
allowed the plaintiff to pursue a legal malpractice claim. 167 In
reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the fact that business
158. 652 P.2d 708 (Kan. 1982).
159. State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708, 709 (Kan. 1982).
160. Id. at 711.
161. Id. (citing Ethical Consideration 5-15 from the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility).
162. 452 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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transactions between a client and attorney are subject to the "clos-
est scrutiny.' 1 68 The court stated that "[t]he burden is placed upon
an attorney to establish by clear and convincing evidence the fair-
ness of an agreement or transaction purporting to convey a prop-
erty right from a client to his attorney.' 69  Attorneys who
understand this burden can avoid malpractice claims such as the
ones asserted in K.M.A. The specific claims in that case could have
been avoided if the firm had a policy banning all investments with
clients, or a policy limiting the ownership interest that attorneys
can possess in a client business. While such a policy limits the au-
tonomy of the individual attorney, it protects firm partners and the
firm itself from possible malpractice claims.
Examination of the facts in Phillips v. Carson170 suggests how a
law firm policy can help limit the vicarious liability of the firm and
its attorneys. 17 1 In Phillips, the Supreme Court of Kansas consid-
ered the liability of firm partners for the acts and omissions of a
specific partner who borrowed money from a firm client. Recog-
nizing that the question of whether the partner was carrying on
usual business of the firm was a disputed fact issue, the court over-
turned a summary judgment granted for the firm and its part-
ners. 172 The court referred to various firm practices and the lack of
a firm policy prohibiting a partner from transacting business with a
client.173 Clearly, such a policy could have helped the firm estab-
lish that the individual attorney's loans were not within his author-
ity as a partner of the firm.
Ultimately, with instances of attorney entrepreneurial activities
involving clients, thorough disclosure and documentation is an es-
sential step in minimizing conflicts of interest claims.174 Given the
168. Meros, 452 So. 2d at 581.
169. Id. (quoting Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965)).
170. 731 P.2d 820 (Kan. 1987).
171. Phillips v. Carson, 731 P.2d 820, 834 (Kan. 1987).
172. Id. at 836.
173. Id.
174. See Monco v. Janus, 583 N.E.2d 575, 581 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining that full
and frank disclosure of all relevant information related to an attorney's business transac-
tion with a client is a factor in determining if an attorney overcomes the presumption that
the transaction proceeded from undue influence exercised by the attorney); see also Bruce
Zucker, Attorneys Who Enter into Business Transactions with Their Clients: A Presumption
of Undue Influence, Malpractice, and Impropriety, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 7, 8-11
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strict disclosure requirements, attorneys who fail to meet these re-
quirements effectively become guarantors of the business deal with
the client. One legal malpractice expert captured this looming risk,
noting that when "trouble develops with the business deal, [a] cli-
ent might swiftly become a former client and [the lawyer] might
swiftly become a defendant." '175
B. Conflicts Relating to Fee Agreements
Another common conflicts problem involving personal interests
of attorneys arises out of fee agreements between attorneys and
their clients. At the time that a prospective client enters a fee
agreement with an attorney, the attorney possesses a great deal of
autonomy in setting the fee and payment terms.176 While the fee
must be reasonable and comply with applicable disciplinary rules
and law, fee agreements are largely a matter of arms-length negoti-
ation between the attorney and client.177 This situation radically
changes after the attorney and the prospective client enter into an
attorney-client relationship. Once an attorney-client relationship is
established, attorneys who seek to change fee and payment terms
effectively create a conflict of interest. Specifically, the conflict
arises because the attorney-fiduciary's interest in earning a fee con-
flicts with the client-principal's reliance on the original terms of the
fee agreement.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers now
includes a specific section dealing with contracts entered into dur-
(1999) (applying the California Rules of Professional Conduct); Lee E. Hejmanowski,
Note, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys' Personal Conflicts of Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
881, 905-09 (1993) (applying the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in a discussion of
the disclosure and consent requirements).
175. ROBERT E. O'MALLEY, New Clients/New Matters, in THE QUALITY PURSUIT, As-
SURING STANDARDS IN THE PRAcrICE OF LAW 104, 111 (Robert Michael Greene ed.,
1989).
176. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b
(2000) (stating "[i]n general, clients and lawyers are free to contract for the fee that the
client is to pay"), with In re Estate of Goldstein, 509 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987 (Sur. Ct. 1986)
(explaining that "[ulnless unconscionable or illegal on its face, a retainer is like any other
contract and therefore, is presumed to be fair unless the contrary appears").
177. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 443, 452 (1998) (describing that in a fee dispute with a client, the attorney must
carry the burden of persuasion on all issues concerning the propriety and reasonableness of
the fee). This burden is imposed for a number of reasons including the fact that the attor-
ney is the person who drafts the contract and undertakes to become a fiduciary. Id.
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ing an attorney's representation of a client. Under the Restate-
ment, such contract modifications are subject to strict scrutiny if
they are not made within a reasonable time after the lawyer has
begun to represent the client.178 To enforce the agreement, the at-
torney must show that the contract and the circumstances of its
formation were fair and reasonable to the client.179 This Restate-
ment provision on enforceability reflects the well-established rule
that attorneys have the burden to insure that contract terms are
fair and reasonable when the contract is entered into subsequent
to employment.18 ° This can be a heavy burden to overcome be-
cause a presumption of unfairness or invalidity attaches to con-
tracts for compensation entered into while the attorney-client
relationship exists.'
81
Notwithstanding these accepted rules, many attorneys create
conflicts with their clients when they modify their agreements.
Those attorneys who forge into contract modifications without ap-
preciating the conflicts face possible discipline and obstacles when
they try to enforce the new terms. If a court considers the modifi-
cation to be a serious breach of fiduciary duty, the attorney may
also face a fee forfeiture of amounts previously paid. 82 Under the
terms of the attorney's legal malpractice policy, such a fee dispute
may not be covered.
Improvement of a firm's ethical infrastructure can help attorneys
deal with the risks associated with changing fee agreements after
the attorney-client relationship has commenced. Above all, ethics
training can help attorneys appreciate the applicable disciplinary
rules and fiduciary principles that apply to contract modifications.
With this understanding, attorneys should recognize the impor-
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 18(1)(a) (2000).
179. Id.
180. See Baye v. Grindlinger, 432 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (reversing
a summary judgment granted for the attorney who sought to collect two promissory notes
executed by the client during trial in which the attorney was representing the client).
181. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) (referring to Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, § 960d (5th ed. 1941)); see also Lustig v. Horn, 732 N.E.2d 613, 619 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (holding that "[a]s a matter of public policy, once raised, a presumption of
undue influence must be rebutted by the attorney by 'clear and convincing' evidence").'
182. See Matthew Nielson, Burrow v. Arce: Too Much Ado About Nothing?, 52 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 487, 495 (2000) (stating that "an overwhelming number of cases have held
that fee forfeiture is appropriate when an attorney places another's or his own interests in
direct conflict with a client's interest").
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tance of screening prospective clients. A firm policy can impress
on attorneys the importance of carefully screening clients to evalu-
ate a number of factors, including the ability of clients to pay fees.
If prospective clients can afford fees, there is less of a risk of having
to make new fee arrangements and later take proprietary interests
to secure fees.
At the outset of representation, attorneys should set fair fees
that the attorney can live with for the duration of the attorney-
client relationship. Setting an adequate fee up-front often elimi-
nates any perceived need to later alter the fee terms. When an
attorney is concerned about prolonged representation, the attorney
can address fee increases in the original fee agreement. To avoid
questions, the provisions for upward adjustment of fees should be
based on some objective indicator or formula. Use of an indicator
or formula avoids a situation in which the increase appears to be a
discretionary exercise of an attorney's subjective judgment. By set-
ting the basis for an adjustment in the original agreement, attor-
neys can effectively increase fees without modifying the terms of
the original agreement.
When increases are not provided for in the original agreement,
the firm should have some mechanism for evaluating whether mod-
ification of the fee agreement is worth the risk of disciplinary and
malpractice claims. One approach is to require that all proposed
modifications be approved by the ethics partner/committee or a
managing partner. When consulted, the partners can scrutinize the
wisdom and approach to modifying the fee agreement. Above all,
steps should be taken to create a "burden of proof" file to demon-
strate that the modification was reasonable and fair to the client.
In addition to documenting full disclosure, the attorneys should
urge the client to seek independent counsel to protect the client's
interests. Depending on the situation, the firm may offer to defray
some of the costs associated with retaining independent counsel.
At the conclusion of representation, attorneys should send ter-
mination letters to communicate to the client that work is com-
plete. Such termination letters should dispel any reasonable
expectation of the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
Thereafter, a new engagement would require a new fee agreement.
If the termination letter clarifies that the firm no longer represents
the client, the new fee agreement should be treated like any other
agreement entered into at the outset of representation, rather than
2002]
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
as an agreement entered into during representation. As discussed
below, termination letters can also help attorneys avoid problems
related to conflicts between and among clients.
C. Conflicts Involving the Representation of Multiple Clients
Regardless of the nature and size of a law practice, conflicts of
interest involving representation of multiple clients appear to be
inevitable. Generally speaking, these conflicts fall into two broad
categories: conflicts between and among the interests of parties
under current representation and conflicts between the interests of
former clients and current clients. Most commonly, conflicts in-
volving simultaneous representation in a business context arise
when attorneys form entities or represent an entity and its constitu-
ents. Less obvious conflicts arise when attorneys take a position
for one client that is adverse to another client's position in an unre-
lated matter. Litigators also face conflicts involving jointly repre-
sented persons when settlements put one client in a better position
than other jointly represented parties. Litigators and non-litigators
alike should be concerned about the second category of conflicts in
which an attorney takes a position adverse to a former client.
While each type of conflict triggers different considerations, the
avoidance of all conflicts involving multiple representation of cli-
ents requires that attorneys understand applicable rules and princi-
ples so that they can first recognize, and then address, possible
conflicts. Firm managers must take steps to educate attorneys on
various types of multiple representation that pose risks. Such edu-
cation helps promote a "conflict-sensitive" practice among all firm
attorneys. 
18 3
Ethics training, coupled with procedures for identifying and
dealing with conflicts, are important features of a firm's conflicts of
interest policy.184 The policy should have separate sections that ap-
ply to conflicts based on simultaneous representation of clients and
successive representation of clients. Each section should address
183. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Uncertain Realm of Former-Client Conflicts, 403
P.L.I. 165, 172 (1990) (emphasizing the "vital importance of firm-wide systems and agree-
ment on high levels of compliance and aggressive in-firm pursuit of conflicts inquires").
184. See David W. Evans, Ethical Issues and Financial Data, 1004 P.L.I. 229, 231
(1997), WESTLAW 1004 PLI/Corp 229 (providing a description of objectives of a conflicts
of interest policy, along with an example).
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the specific procedures for detecting and addressing possible con-
flicts. A firm's system for identifying potential problems should be
the focal point of a conflicts of interest policy. Without doubt, the
actual success of a system in protecting the firm and its clients de-
pends on the comprehensiveness of the system and compliance
with established procedures.
A number of cases reveal how gaps in systems lead, or at least
contribute, to conflicts problems. Undoubtedly, the most glaring
oversight occurs when attorneys fail to conduct a conflicts check.
A firm that fails to conduct a conflicts check will not be able to
defend its position on the basis of lack of knowledge. In one pro-
bate case, the court unequivocally stated, "[any time a law firm
undertakes representation of a client, it has an obligation to do a
conflicts check to ensure that no conflict exists between clients.
185
Cases also suggest that delegating the task of conducting a con-
flicts check to support staff can lead to problems. For example, in
the disqualification case of Parkinson v. Phonex Corp.,186 no con-
flicts check was completed, notwithstanding the fact that the attor-
ney asked an assistant to prepare a conflicts check for circulation
among firm members. 87 The lesson from this case is that attorneys
should assume responsibility for ensuring that conflicts checks are
conducted. 88 As a back-up measure, the firm should create obsta-
cles to work being performed until a conflicts check is completed.
One safeguard that firms commonly use is to create a kind of "fire-
wall," preventing the opening of files or billing of time before a
conflicts review is done.1 89 Even for current clients of the firm, the
185. Estate of Fogleman v. Fegen, 3 P.3d 1172, 1179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). In this
case, the court clarified that "all attorneys involved in probate matters have a duty to check
for possible conflicts before representing a personal representative or administering an
estate." Id. at 1180.
186. 857 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Utah 1994).
187. See Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1474, 1475 (D. Utah 1994) (holding
that the disqualification of the plaintiff's law firm was not required where another attorney
in the plaintiff's law firm represented the named defendant for a period of one month).
188. See In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 150 B.R. 1008, 1014 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)
(questioning the sufficiency of the firm's practice of using a clerk to run a computerized
conflict check).
189. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verit& Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the
Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 322 (1997) (adding
that one survey of 156 firms comprised of fifty or more lawyers in Michigan, Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, and Oregon found that virtually all respondent firms indicated that new files
could not be opened without a conflicts review).
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firewall should deter attorneys from performing work until a new
conflicts check is completed on any new matter. The firm's policies
and procedures should also have mechanisms for triggering a con-
flicts check when there are new developments in a case 1 90
In tackling conflicts between clients, attorneys need to classify
clients as either current clients or former clients. Model Rule 1.9
applies to conflicts involving former clients, while Model Rule 1.7
deals with conflicts involving current clients. 191 These rules give
attorneys more latitude to take positions adverse to former clients
as compared to current clients. 192 Therefore, attorneys who want
more freedom to accept representation and avoid disqualifying
conflicts should communicate to the client when representation
commences and terminates. For example, firm policies and proce-
dures should require the use of engagement letters that expressly
state that representation in a new matter will require a new en-
gagement letter. To define when the attorney-client relationship
ends and to negate the possibility that a client will be treated as a
current client, one ethics expert suggests that firms consider includ-
ing the following provision in engagement agreements:
Unless [the client] has paid the firm a general retainer, all engage-
ments are on a case-by-case basis rather than an ongoing basis.
When the firm completes its services for the client, the relationship
of attorney and client is concluded, regardless of whether the firm
has formally closed its files and regardless of whether the client has
completed payment of any outstanding fees and expenses. 93
Termination letters can also be used to eliminate a client's expecta-
tion of continuing representation.
94
190. For example, when a new party is to be added to litigation, an attorney should
not be able to obtain a firm check to pay the fees for adding the new party until the
attorney has completed a conflicts check with information related to the new party.
191. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9, 1.7 (2001).
192. Id. Under Model Rule 1.9, former client consent is not required for an attorney
to undertake representation of a client whose interests are materially adverse to the inter-
ests of a former client if the current representation and former matter are not "substan-
tially related" to each other. Id. 1.9. On the other hand, Model Rule 1.7 requires client
consent after consultation anytime representation of one client is directly adverse to an-
other client or when representation of one client may be materially limited by the attor-
ney's responsibilities to another client. Id. 1.7.
193. NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE
AND THE PROFESSION 24 (2d ed. 2000).
194. See generally A.B.A. LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE 97 (2d ed. 1999) (providing a sample closing letter).
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IV. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE INEVITABILITY
OF CONFLICT CLAIMS
The above discussion reveals the complications inherent in trying
to avoid conflict claims and their consequences. Mechanical fail-
ures in conflicts systems can result in conflicts not being detected.
Such mechanical failures may be either in system design or input,
or a combination of the two. While certain aspects of conflict
avoidance are mechanical, human factors intrude at many levels.
Ultimately, decision-makers, collectively or individually, must de-
cide whether to accept particular representation. In this decision-
making process, the lack of understanding or education can under-
mine the desire to avoid conflicts. Economic pressures may also
tempt individual attorneys and firms to risk representation, despite
questionable conflicts issues. Most significantly, an atmosphere
which does not foster respect for the need to avoid conflicts can
render ineffective even the most sophisticated system.
Admittedly, firms and attorneys are motivated to make a profit
providing legal services. In seeking to maximize profit through
business generation and production, attorneys may focus on the
short-term benefits of accepting representation, even when "con-
flicts red flags" beckon caution. The perspective is reflected in the
title of "conflicts resolution counsel" used by some in-house firm
counsel. The title suggests that the attorney's goal is to "fix" a situ-
ation by resolving conflicts, rather than declining representation.
Such a cultural attitude can be reshaped when firm principals ap-
preciate the long-term efficiency and financial benefit of conflicts
systems and risk management.
Today, attorneys' assessment of the value and costs of monitor-
ing conflicts must take into account the risk of fee forfeiture for a
breach of fiduciary duty.195 Under the Restatement and case law,
attorneys can now be forced to disgorge fees for such a breach
195. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W. 2d 229, 232 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing that actual
damages need not be proven for a client to be entitled to fee forfeiture as a remedy for an
attorney's breach of fiduciary duty). Compare Matthew Nielsen, Burrow v. Arce: Too
Much Ado About Nothing?, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 487, 503-11 (2000) (discussing the affect of
the Burrow decision), with Errin Martin, The Line Has Been Drawn on the Attorney-Client
Relationship: The Implications of Burrow v. Arce on Texas Practitioners, 32 TEX. TEcH L.
REv. 391, 392-93 (2001) (examining the implications of the Burrow decision).
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even without proof of damages. 196 By implementing controls to
avoid conflicts of interest, attorneys significantly improve their
ability to defend claims based on breach of fiduciary duty. When
precautions are taken, a disgruntled client should not be able to
prove an intentional breach of duty. Precautionary efforts should
also assist the firm in defeating negligent breach of fiduciary
claims. 197
Despite precautionary efforts, conflicts may still arise. For those
inevitable conflicts, two law and economics scholars recommend
reforming conflicts regulation.' 98 Specifically, Professors Jonathan
R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller advocate a market approach that
would allow attorneys to compensate their clients and former cli-
ents for the right to engage in conflicting representation of other
clients.' 99
In the final analysis, attorneys must evaluate the efficiency of
devoting time and resources to conflicts avoidance. By spreading
the costs of monitoring across a firm's entire portfolio of business,
firm managers may recognize that it is more efficient to invest in
monitoring than to roll the dice and run the risk of fee forfeiture
and other serious penalties associated with impermissible conflicts.
For modern law firms, the problems posed by protecting against
conflicts claims may be a cost of doing business, but they are a cost
worth paying.
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (noting
that "[a] lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be required
to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter"). The Reporter's Notes,
comment c, include numerous examples of breaches justifying fee forfeiture. Id. § 37 cmt.
C.
197. See id. § 49 cmt. d (2001) (noting that an attorney who acts with reasonable care
is not liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duty). For example, an attorney who per-
forms an "adequate" conflicts search may not be liable. Id. at illus. 2. Because a compe-
tently maintained conflicts system would not have revealed the conflict, the attorney is not
liable for negligent or intentional breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
198. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict
of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 1003 (1997) (recommending revising ethics
rules to "explicitly recognize the utility of a market-based solution" to dealing with client
consent to conflicts).
199. See id. (discussing the dynamics of clients and attorneys "negotiating" consent).
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